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Abstract
As Moore’s law has been continuously improving the microprocessor’s speed, performance is no
longer the only focus. Software robustness has become one of the increasingly important issues.
However, recent impressive advances in computer architecture have not led to significant improve-
ment in software robustness. Since software robustness is mainly affected by software bugs, the
focuses of this research are to provide efficient and simple architectural support to improve dy-
namic monitoring for detecting memory-related bugs, and to propose a new bug detection method
and an incremental consistency check framework that both leverage the proposed architectural
support.
In this dissertation, we propose the Intelligent Watcher (iWatcher), a novel architectural scheme
to monitor dynamic execution automatically, flexibly and with minimal overhead. iWatcher asso-
ciates program-specified monitoring functions with memory locations. When any such location is
accessed, the monitoring function is automatically triggered with low overhead. To further reduce
overhead and support rollback, iWatcher can optionally leverage Thread-Level Speculation (TLS).
The experimental results with seven buggy applications (with various bugs) show that iWatcher
detects all the bugs evaluated in our experiments with only a 0.1-179% execution overhead.
We also propose a new statistics-based method, called program counter (PC)-based invariance,
to detect memory-related bugs on the fly, and a simple architectural extension, called theCheck
Look-aside Buffer (CLB), that takes advantage of the bloom filter and the temporal object access
locality to reduce the monitoring overhead in iWatcher. The PC-based invariance idea captures the
invariant of the set of PCs that normally access a given key variable, and detects accesses by outlier
instructions that are often caused by memory corruption, buffer overflow, stack smashing or other
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memory-related bugs. we build an automatic, low-overhead, low-false-alarm, PC-based invariant
detection tool called AccMon (Access Monitor, pronounced as “A-k-Mon”) that uses a combination
of architectural, run-time system, and compiler support to catch hard-to-find memory-related bugs.
AccMon leverages the iWatcher framework with the CLB extension to monitor accesses to key
variables. Our experimental results with seven buggy applications (with a total of ten bugs) show
that AccMon can detect all ten bugs with few false alarms (0 for five applications and 2-8 for two
applications), whereas several tested existing tools fail to detect some bugs. AccMon also has low
overhead (0.24-2.88 times), which is an order of magnitude lower than Purify.
We also use the binary instrumentation tool PIN to build a pure software implementation of
PC-based invariant detection called AccMon-S. AccMon-S does not require hardware support, but
has much higher execution overheads (10.4-57.8 times), so it can only be used for in-house bug
detection instead of bug detection during production runs. Besides detecting all ten bugs tested
in AccMon, AccMon-S also detected two real bugs in two large real-word server applications,
Apache and Squid, with few false alarms (0-4).
We also present an incremental checking framework, called iChecker, that leverages iWatcher
to provide an iChecker library for efficient, incremental, run-time consistency checks of mutable
data structures in C programs. The basic idea of iChecker is to perform a consistency check with a
local check (on the parts that need to be checked due to the modifications since the last consistency
check) instead of with a global check. The evaluation using four case studies shows that iChecker
reduces the checking overhead by 1.1–155 times (23.3 on average) over global checks for large
data structures. The required code modifications for iChecker are 25–108 lines (including the
global checkers), which are 10–56 lines more than the modifications for traditional global checks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software bugs significantly affect system reliability, availability and security. Software debugging
often relies on inserting run-time software checks. In many cases, however, program execution
typically slows down significantly, often by 10-100 times, and it is hard to find the root cause of a
bug. Moreover, most dynamic checkers cannot find those hard-to-find program-specific bugs.
Recent impressive performance improvements in computer architecture have not led to sig-
nificant gains in the case of software debugging. While recent work on architectural support for
software debugging provides a good foundation, it is still far from providing a complete solution.
This dissertation work takes another step toward the goal of improving software debugging
using architectural support. It proposes a novel architectural framework iWatcher for dynamic
monitoring. It proposes a new statistics-based bug detection method, and builds an automatic
detection tool AccMon for memory-related bugs using this method and leveraging the iWatcher
framework. Finally, it also proposes an incremental checking framework iChecker for data struc-
ture consistency check in C programs, again leveraging the iWatcher framework.
1.1 Motivation
As Moore’s law has been continuously improving the microprocessor’s speed, performance is no
longer the only focus. Instead, other issues, such as software robustness, hardware reliability and
low power/energy efficient design, etc., are becoming increasingly important.
Software robustness problems are mainly caused by software bugs, because bugs significantly
affect system reliability, availability and security. The increasing software complexity causes more
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software bugs and also makes them harder to detect. Despite costly efforts to improve software-
development methodologies, software bugs in deployed programs continue to thrive, often ac-
counting for up to 40% of computer system failures [MS00]. Software bugs can crash systems,
making services unavailable or, in the form of “silent” bugs, corrupt information or generate wrong
outputs. According to NIST [Nat02], software bugs cost the U.S. economy an estimated $59.5 bil-
lion annually, or 0.6% of the GDP!
There are different types of software bugs, such as memory-related bugs, concurrency bugs,
etc. Among them, memory-related bugs are the most security critical and the most common ones.
Memory-related bugs are caused by improper handling of memory objects and also major causes
of security problems. Attackers exploit memory bugs to execute malicious code on otherwise safe
computers, steal confidential information, or deplete the service by crashing or overloading it.
Based on CERT advisories, in 2001-2004, more than 50% of security vulnerabilities are caused by
memory-related bugs. Therefore, detecting memory bugs is very important for finding the security
vulnerabilities, particularly in programs written in an unsafe language such as C/C++, and it is also
the focus of this work.
Memory-related bugs can be further classified into: (1) Buffer overflow: Illegal access beyond
the buffer boundary. (2) Stack smashing: Illegally overwrite the function return address. (3)
Memory leak: Dynamically allocated memory have no reference to it, hence can never be freed.
(4) Uninitialized read: Read memory data before it is initialized. The reading result is illegal. (5)
Double free: One memory location freed twice. (6) Some program-specific (semantic) bugs: Bugs
that are inconsistent with the original design and the programmers’ intention, and also caused by
improper handling of memory object, such as wrong assignment. As we will see later, the bug in
linux-simple benchmark in chapter 4 is an example of such a bug, caused by copy-pasting.
1.1.1 Existing Software Debugging Techniques
Current debugging techniques consist largely of interactive debuggers, static checking, and dy-
namic monitoring, all of which have significant limitations. Interactive debuggers, such as gdb and
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the debug tool embedded in Microsoft Visual Studio, are widely used by most programmers to find
bugs. Since programmers know about the program, they can rely on the interactive debugger to
find program-specific bugs by hand. However, since running programs in a debugger is very slow,
and the programmer needs to manually examine the execution, interactive debugging is very time-
consuming, and requires large human effort and experience. Moreover, it is very hard to reproduce
a bug, because the bug may occur only after hours or even days of execution, only with a particular
combination of user input and/or hardware configurations, or only with a particular interleaving of
timing-related events.
Static checking performs checks statically. Examples of static approach include explicit model
checking [MPC+02, SD95] and program analysis [CLL+02, EA03, HCXE02]. Most static tools
require significant programmer involvement to write specifications or annotate programs. In addi-
tion, most static tools are limited by aliasing problems and other compile-time limitations. This is
especially the case for programs written in unsafe languages such as C or C++, the predominant
programming languages in industry. As a result, many bugs often remain in programs even after
aggressive static checking.
Dynamic monitoring monitors the execution and checks for rule or invariant violations. It
can be classified into two categories: programmer-specified monitoring and automatic monitor-
ing. Assertion and data structure consistency checks fall into programmer-specified monitoring,
because they require programmers to provide checks. In this work, consistency of a data structure
means that the states of the data structure satisfy certain properties during the entire program ex-
ecution except within some operations that intentionally violate the properties while evolving the
data structure from one consistent state to another. A traditional consistency check usually needs
to traverse the entire data structure to determine that the consistency properties hold, and is very
expensive.
Many dynamic monitors belong to the automatic monitoring category, including Purify [HJ92],
Valgrind [NS03], Intel Thread Checker [KAI], DIDUCE [HL02], Eraser [SBN+97], CCured [CHM+03,
NMW02], and other tools [ABS94, CPM+98, LYHR01, PF97, PF95]. The strength of dynamic
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approach is that the analysis is based on actual execution paths and accurate values of variables
and aliasing information.
Unfortunately, most dynamic checkers suffer from one or more of the following three limi-
tations. First, inefficiency: they are often computationally expensive. One major reason is their
large instrumentation cost [HL02, SBN+97], since almost all existing dynamic checkers insert
instrumentation in the code for checking rule or invariant violations. Another reason is that dy-
namic checkers that attempt to check accesses to certain locations may end up instrumenting more
places than necessary due to lack of accurate information at instrumentation time for languages like
C/C++. As a result, some dynamic checkers slow down a program by 6-30 times [HL02, SBN+97],
which makes such tools undesirable for production runs. Moreover, some timing-sensitive bugs
may never occur with these slowdowns.
Second, inaccuracy: most dynamic checkers rely on compilers or pre-processing tools to insert
instrumentation for checking accesses to certain locations, and, therefore, are limited by imperfect
variable disambiguation, especially for C/C++. Consequently, some accesses to a monitored lo-
cation may be missed by the instrumentation tool. Because of this reason, some bugs are caught
much later than when they actually occur, which makes it hard to find the root cause of the bug.
Third, limited bug coverage: many dynamic checkers can detect only those bugs that violate
some basic programming rules such as “an array pointer cannot move out-of-bounds”, and fail
to detect other bugs that are specific to the monitored software. For example, a forget-to-change
bug (see the linux-simple benchmark in Chapter 4) caused by copy-pasting in the latest version of
Linux can result in an incorrect pointer assignment to the wrong location. This bug does not violate
any programming-based rules and thereby cannot be detected by most existing dynamic checkers.
This work focuses on addressing the above three limitations of dynamic monitoring.
1.1.2 Architectural Support for Software Debugging
As micro-architectural innovations have significantly improved performance, interest has recently
risen in the architecture community to use transistors to improve software debugging. However,
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the current state of the art is very primitive, largely limited to watchpoints [Int04, SPA92] and event
or branch trace buffers [Int04, Spr02].
Watchpoints, such as those supported by Intel’s x86 [Int04] and Sun’s SPARC [SPA92], trigger
an exception every time that a programmer-specified memory location is accessed. While they
are a good starting point, they have several limitations. First, they do not provide low-overhead
checks that can be on all the time in a production run. This is because they trigger the exception
mechanism, which has very high overhead and disrupts the execution of the application. Second,
current architectures only support a handful of watchpoints (four in Intel x86).
Besides watchpoints, branch or event trace buffers [Int04, Spr02] can also potentially be used
for debugging purposes, such as providing more program state information in a crash. However,
they do not provide highly-processed information that could truly boost debuggability.
Recently, there have been some research proposals for micro-architectural support for software
debugging. For example, Prvulovic and Torrellas proposed ReEnact [PT03], which uses the state
buffering, rollback and re-execution features of Thread-Level Speculation (TLS) to detect data
races on the fly. Xu et al. designed the “flight data recorder” [XBH03], which enables off-line
deterministic replay and can be used for postmortem analysis of a bug. BugNet [NPC05] proposed
by Narayanasamy et al. further reduces the amount of data recorded for deterministic replaying
of an execution. Tuck et al. uses hardware and binary rewriting to protect pointers from buffer
overflow [TCV04]. While recent work is promising and provides a good foundation, they provide
relatively limited functionality (i.e., handle only certain types of bugs or provide only a trace) and
are also relatively expensive, which indicates architectural support for software debugging is still
far from providing a complete solution. This dissertation work takes another step toward the goal
of improving software debugging using architectural support.
Novel architectural support would provide several benefits for improving software debugging
over software-only solutions: (1) Efficiency: Architectural support can significantly lower the over-
head of dynamic monitoring because it does not need extensive code instrumentation. Note also
that such instrumentation can interfere with compiler optimizations. Moreover, it is possible to
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use extra hardware to speed up certain operations. (2) Accuracy: Architectural support can avoid
pointer aliasing problems and accurately capture all desired accesses to monitored memory ob-
jects. (3) Generality: Architectural support can be language-independent, cross-module and easy
to use with low-level system code such as the operating system. Moreover, it can be designed to
work directly with binary code without recompilation.
1.2 My Dissertation Work
My thesis is that using architectural support and novel techniques can improve the three main
aspects of dynamic monitoring: efficiency, accuracy, and coverage.
This dissertation work provides novel, general and simple architectural support for dynamic
monitoring, proposes a new bug detection method to catch those hard-to-catch program-specific
memory bugs, and proposes an incremental consistency check framework which both leverage the
proposed architectural support to reduce overhead. I made the following contributions in my work:
1. This work proposes the Intelligent Watcher (iWatcher), an efficient and flexible architectural
scheme to monitor dynamic execution automatically, flexibly and with minimal overhead.
iWatcher associates program-specified monitoring functions with memory locations. When
any such location is accessed, the monitoring function is automatically triggered with low
overhead. To further reduce overhead and support rollback, iWatcher can optionally leverage
Thread-Level Speculation (TLS). The experimental results with seven buggy applications
(with various bugs) show that iWatcher detects all the bugs evaluated in our experiments
with only a 0.1%-179% execution overhead. Overall, iWatcher’s reasonably small overhead
and ability to monitor many memory locations enable it to be used during both in-house
testing and production runs.
2. This work proposes a new statistics-based method, called program counter (PC)-based in-
variant, to detect memory-related bugs on the fly, and a simple architectural extension, called
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the Check Look-aside Buffer (CLB), that uses a Bloom filter [Blo70] and takes advantage of
the good temporal locality that exists in object accesses to reduce the monitoring overhead in
iWatcher. The PC-based invariant idea captures the invariant of the set of PCs that normally
access a given key variable, and detects accesses by outlier instructions that are often caused
by memory corruption, buffer overflow, stack smashing or other memory-related bugs. It
also builds an automatic, low-overhead, low-false-alarm, PC-based invariant detection tool
called AccMon (Access Monitor, pronounced as “A-k-Mon”) that uses a combination of
architectural, run-time system, and compiler support to catch hard-to-find memory-related
bugs. AccMon leverages the iWatcher framework with the CLB extension to monitor ac-
cesses to key variables. Our experimental results with seven buggy applications (with a
total of ten bugs) show that AccMon can detect all ten bugs with few false alarms (0 for
five applications and 2-8 for two applications), whereas several tested existing tools fail to
detect some bugs. AccMon also has low overhead (0.24-2.88 times), which is an order of
magnitude lower than Purify [HJ92].
3. This work also uses the binary instrumentation tool PIN [LCM+05] to build a pure software
implementation of PC-based invariant detection called AccMon-S. AccMon-S does not re-
quire hardware support, but has much higher execution overheads (10.39-57.83 times), so it
can only be used for in-house bug detection instead of bug detection during production runs.
Besides detecting all ten bugs tested in AccMon, AccMon-S also detected two real bugs in
two large real-word server applications, Apache and Squid, with few false alarms (0-4).
4. This work presents an incremental checking framework, called iChecker, that leverages
iWatcher to provide a library for efficient, incremental, run-time consistency checks of mu-
table data structures in C programs. The idea of iChecker is to perform a consistency check
with a local check (on the parts that need to be checked due to the modifications since the last
consistency check) instead of with a global check. The programmer only needs to indicate
the data structure to be checked and its associated local check function, and call a few library
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calls in limited places. It is iChecker’s responsibility to figure out on which portions of the
data structure to perform this local check function. The evaluation using four case studies
shows that iChecker reduces the checking overhead by 1.1–155 times (23.3 on average) over
global checks for large data structures with 0.3–17.9 times (11.2 on average) space over-
head. The required code modifications for iChecker are 25–108 lines (including the global
checkers), which are 10–56 lines more than the modifications for traditional global checks
and only account for 0.1%–21% of the original code.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background and
related work. Chapter 3 proposes iWatcher for dynamic monitoring. Chapter 4 presents the PC-
based invariant detection idea, and the automatic tools AccMon (hardware support) and AccMon-S
(pure software) for detecting memory-related bugs. Chapter 5 presents iChecker, the incremental
check framework for mutable data structure consistency. Chapter 6 summarizes my current work
and outlines the future research plans.
The materials in some chapters have been published as journal and conference papers. Some
materials in Chapter 3 have been presented in [ZQL+04] and [ZZQ+05]. The materials in Chap-
ter 4 have been presented in [ZLF+04].
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter discusses background and previous work related to our work.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Dynamic Execution Monitoring
Many methods have been proposed for dynamic code monitoring. The most commonly used ones
are assertions, dynamic checkers, and watchpoints.
Assertions Assertions are inserted by programmers to perform sanity checks at certain places. If
the condition specified in an assertion is false, the program aborts. Assertions are one of the most
commonly used methods for debugging. However, they can add significant overhead to program
execution. Moreover, it is often hard to identify all the places where assertions should be placed.
Dynamic Checkers Dynamic checkers are automated tools that detect common bugs at run time.
For example, DIDUCE [HL02] automatically infers likely program invariants, and uses them to
detect program bugs. Purify [HJ92] and Valgrind [NS03] monitor memory accesses to detect
memory leaks and some simple instances of memory corruption, such as freeing a buffer twice or
reading an uninitialized memory location. StackGuard [CPM+98] can detect some buffer overflow
bugs, which have been a major cause of security attacks. Eraser [SBN+97] can detect data races
by dynamically tracking the set of locks held during program execution. These tools usually use
compilers or code-rewriting tools such as ATOM [SE94], EEL [LS95] and Dyninst [BH00] to
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instrument programs with checks.
While this approach is promising, dynamic checkers often suffer from the following limita-
tions: (1) aliasing problems, especially in C or C++ programs, (2) high run-time overhead, (3)
hard-coded bug detection functionality, (4) language specificity, and (5) difficulty to work with
low-level code.
Hardware-Assisted Watchpoints Hardware-assisted watchpoints [Int01, KH92, SPA92] use
simple hardware support to watch a user-selected memory location. When a watched location
is accessed by the program, an exception is handled by an interactive debugger such as gdb. Then,
the state of the process can be examined by programmers using the debugger. The hardware sup-
port is provided through a few special debug registers. Watchpoints are designed to be used in
an interactive debugger. For non-interactive execution monitoring, they are both inflexible and
inefficient. They do not provide a way to associate an automatic check to the access of a watched
location. Moreover, they require an expensive exception when a watched location is accessed.
Finally, most architectures only support a few watchpoints (four in Intel’s x86).
2.1.2 Classifying Dynamic Monitoring Methods
We classify the dynamic monitoring methods into two categories:
• Code-Controlled Monitoring (CCM). Monitoring is performed only at special points in the
program. Assertions and most dynamic checkers belong to CCM because they only check at
assertions or instrumentation points.
• Location-Controlled Monitoring (LCM). Monitoring is associated directly with memory
locations and therefore all accesses to such memory locations are monitored. Hardware-
assisted watchpoints and iWatcher belong to this category.
If we want to monitor the accesses to particular memory locations, which is a common tech-
nique used for bug detection, LCM has two advantages over CCM: (1) LCM monitors all accesses
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to a watched memory location using all possible variable names or pointers, whereas CCM may
miss some accesses because of pointer aliasing; (2) LCM monitors only those memory instructions
that truly access a watched memory location, whereas CCM may need to instrument at many un-
necessary points due to the lack of accurate information at instrumentation time. Therefore, LCM
can be used to detect both invariant violations and illegal accesses to a memory location, whereas
it may be difficult and too expensive for CCM to check for illegal accesses. The main advantage
of CCM is that it does not require hardware support while LCM typically needs it. In the case that
we want to perform monitoring at specific execution points, CCM will be enough.
2.1.3 Invariant-Based Bug Detection
Similar to previous invariant-based bug detection work such as DAIKON [ECGN99, ECGN00]
and DIDUCE [HL02], AccMon can be used in two scenarios. The first one is debugging programs
that fail on some inputs. It is common for many programs to work correctly on some inputs
(especially those tested in-house) but to fail on others. Invariant detection tools can be used to
automatically provide debugging information on failing cases by checking for invariants inferred
from successful cases. The second one is debugging failures in long-running programs. Some
bugs occur only after the program has executed for a long time. These bugs are very common in
server programs, and are usually hard to track down because they cannot be easily (or quickly)
reproduced. Automatic invariant detection and checking tools can use a period of execution time
before the bug occurs to extract invariants, and then continuously check for violations of these
invariants during the remainder of the execution to detect bugs.
For the above two usage models, the dynamic invariant detection and checking process has two
phases: the training phase and the bug-detection phase. The training phase tries to extract invariants
from the program’s execution using good inputs in the first usage scenario, or from the initial
execution (before a bug occurs) in the second usage scenario. The bug-detection phase checks
for violations of invariants during the execution on failing or untested inputs, or the remaining
execution after the training phase.
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2.1.4 Thread-Level Speculation (TLS)
TLS is an architectural technique for speculative parallelization of sequential programs [CMT00,
SBV95, SCZM00, THA+99]. TLS support can be built on a multithreaded architecture, such as
simultaneous multithreading (SMT) or chip multiprocessor (CMP) machines. With TLS, the exe-
cution of a sequential program is divided into a sequence of microthreads (also called tasks, slices,
or epochs). These microthreads are then executed speculatively in parallel, while special hardware
detects violations of the program’s sequential semantics. A violation results in squashing the in-
correctly executed microthreads and re-executing them. To enable squash and re-execution, the
memory state of each speculative microthread is typically buffered in caches or special buffers.
When a microthread finishes its execution and becomes safe, it can commit. Committing a mi-
crothread implies merging its state with the safe memory. To guarantee sequential semantics,
microthreads commit in order.
iWatcher can leverage TLS to reduce monitoring overhead and to support rollback and re-
execution of a buggy code region [PT03]. For our design, we assume an SMT machine, and that
the speculative memory state is buffered in caches. However, our iWatcher design can be easily
ported to other TLS architectures.
If we use TLS in iWatcher, each cache line is tagged with the ID of the microthread to which
the line belongs. Moreover, for each speculative microthread, the processor contains a copy of the
initial state of the architectural registers. This copy is generated when the speculative microthread
is spawned and is freed when the microthread commits. It is used in case the microthread needs to
be rolled back.
The TLS mechanisms for in-cache state buffering and rollback can be reused to support incre-
mental rollback and re-execution of the buggy code [PT03]. To do this, the basic TLS is modified
slightly by postponing the commit time of a successful microthread. In the basic TLS, a mi-
crothread can commit when it completes and all its predecessors have committed. We say that
such a microthread is ready. To support the rollback of buggy code, a ready microthread commits
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only in one of two cases: when we need space in the cache and when the number of uncommitted
microthreads exceeds a certain threshold. With this support, a ready but uncommitted microthread
can still be asked to rollback. This feature can be used to support one of the iWatcher modes
(Section 3.3.5).
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Dynamic Monitoring
Many tools have been proposed for dynamic execution monitoring. Well-known examples include
Purify [HJ92], Intel thread checker [KAI], Eraser [SBN+97], StackGuard [CPM+98], DIDUCE [HL02],
Valgrind [NS03], CCured [CHM+03, NMW02], and many others [ABS94, LYHR01, PF97, PF95].
StackGuard only detects attacks against stack return addresses — not general memory-related
bugs. Eraser and Intel thread checker target multithreaded programming, and detect data races in
multithreaded programs. SafeC [ABS94] presents a pointer and array access checking technique.
By using a novel safe pointer structure and adding monitor instructions, most spatial and temporal
access errors can be detected. It has the limitations of the programming-rule-based approach as
mentioned below.
Most of these tools rely on instrumentation to perform dynamic checks. Consequently, to check
all possible accesses to a given location, they typically need to instrument more than necessary.
Moreover, most dynamic checkers impose significant run-time overhead. Our work innovates with
general, efficient and flexible location-controlled monitoring capability.
As discussed in Chapter 4, most dynamic bug detection methods can be classified into two
types: programming-rule-based (PRB) and statistics-rule-based (SRB). These two are not compet-
ing techniques. Instead, they complement each other since both offer unique advantages that can
be integrated to detect a wider range of bugs. Since both approaches focus on different types of
rules, the types of bugs caught by them often differ. For example, a wrong pointer assignment
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bug caused by copy-paste does not violate any PRB rules, but may violate a SRB rule, such as a
PC-based invariant. However, SRB usually requires inferring rules from normal runs, which may
not always be possible. Therefore, PRB is more useful for catching relatively simple bugs that
obviously violate programming rules, whereas SRB is more applicable to detecting those “silent”
bugs that successfully pass through many regression tests before the software is released. These
regression tests allow statistical rules to be extracted.
Schnarr and Larus have proposed using unused processor cycles to reduce overhead for code-
controlled monitoring [SL96]. Our work differs from theirs in that iWatcher provides convenient,
flexible architectural support to perform location-controlled monitoring, and uses TLS to hide
monitoring overheads.
Oplinger and Lam have used TLS to hide the overhead for dynamic monitoring [OL02]. iWatcher
also exploits the benefits of recently proposed TLS architecture. However, in iWatcher, the thread
spawning is automatically done by the hardware, whereas their study uses compilers to insert the
thread-spawning into the programs.
2.2.2 Data-Consistency Checking
A closely related work to ours is that of Demsky et al. [DR03, DR05]. They propose a specification-
based approach that automatically translates a programmer-provided specification of consistency
properties into a global consistency checks (and repair code) for C/C++ programs. Our work
differs in that we require the programmer to provide a local checking function written in C instead
of a specification written in a different language. Moreover, our framework automatically supports
incremental checks to reduce overhead and their work still performs expensive global checks.
Previous studies on consistency check also appeared in other domains, for example database
systems [CFPT94, UD90], file systems, and operating systems [GJKW97, MA87]. These works
provide application-specific solutions, whereas ours provides a general framework that can be used
for almost any C programs.
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2.2.3 Incremental Computation
Incremental computation computes the new output (for a new input) incrementally by reusing
parts of the old computation (for an old input), instead of recomputing the entire output from the
scratch. Incremental computation works well when a small change in input implies a small change
in output, and there is only a small change in input. A widely used approach for incremental
computation is based on the dependency graph of the computation [DRT81, YS88, ABH02]. The
previous work proposed some foundational techniques but applied them in the context of attribute
grammars [DRT81], specialized new languages [YS88] (that, for example, have no recursion or
loops) or functional languages [ABH02].
Another approach for incremental computation is to generate the incremental code from the
original code [LT95, ZL98]. Liu and Teitelbaum proposed a systematic approach for deriving
incremental programs [LT95], and Zhang and Lin made the derivation semi-automated [ZL98].
The crucial difference between the previous work and our work is that our work applies to
the C language that has mutable data structures and performs the computation with statements
that mutate the state. In comparison, functional languages have mostly immutable structures and
perform the computation by evaluating the expressions. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no work for incremental computation of imperative, C-like languages.
2.2.4 Other Related Work
Our work is related to previous work on fine-grain access control [S+94, WCA02]. For example,
Mondrian Memory Protection (MMP) [WCA02] provides access control at word granularity using
a “protection look-aside buffer” (PLB) to record protection information. MMP can potentially be
used to implement location-controlled monitoring. However, like hardware-assisted watchpoints,
it needs to raise an exception and, therefore can add significant overhead.
Our work is also related to some of the classic work on capability-based architectures [Fab74,
Lev84], protection-enhanced architectures [KCE92], hardware support for security [FS01, L+00,
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SCG+03, XKPI02], TLS [CMT00, SBV95, SCZM00, THA+99], and hardware support for instruction-
level profiling [DHW+97].
Besides iWatcher and dynamic instrumentation tool PIN [LCM+05], PC-based invariant de-
tection can also be implemented by using other software-based instrumentation tools such as
ATOM [SE94] or Dyninst [HMC94], hardware watchpoints [Int01, Joh82, SPA92, Wah92], or
other tools [DHW+97]. However, we expect that these tools would result in significant overheads,
similar to the overheads of our software implementation AccMon-S. In addition, it is possible to
use special hardware [WCA02] that provides fine-grain access control to monitor memory accesses
in AccMon. We use iWatcher for the reasons given in Section 3.4.
Our work is also related to address profiling techniques for performance optimization. Calder
et al proposed a data placement strategy based on temporal relations by profiling memory ac-
cesses [CCJA98]. Barrett et al used address profiling to predict the life time of heap variables and
then used this information to reduce the memory page fault rate [BZ93]. In our work, we monitor
memory accesses to detect software bugs.
There are several works that use Bloom filters in hardware. They use a Bloom filter to minimize
load/store queue (LSQ) searches [SDB+03], to identify cache misses early in the pipeline [PLL02],
and to filter cache-coherence traffic in snoopy bus-based SMP systems to reduce energy consump-
tion [MMFC01].
Our work is also related to computation reuse [SS97, CmWH99, dCFF00, HL03] and mem-
oization [Pug88, HLY00, MFH95, ABH03], which exploit computation redundancy by reusing
previously computed values. Our work differs from these works in that we focus on incrementally
checking data structure consistency for mutable data structures, whereas the above work focuses
on simply reusing the previously computed values.
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Chapter 3
iWatcher: Architectural Support for
Dynamic Monitoring
3.1 Overview
Recent impressive advances in microprocessor performance have failed to deliver significant gains
in ease of software debugging. This is a major shortcoming of the state of the art, given that
software bugs have major implications on computer system availability, reliability and security.
Specifically, software bugs account for as much as 40% of computer system failures [MS00], more
than 50% of security vulnerabilities in 2001-2004 based on CERT advisories, and cost the U.S.
economy $59.5 billion annually, or 0.6% of the GDP [Nat02]!
As we discussed in section 1.1, code debugging is largely done using software techniques: in-
teractive debugger, static checking and dynamic monitoring. They all have significant limitations.
This chapter focuses on addressing the first two limitations of dynamic monitoring: inefficiency
(large run-time overhead) and inaccuracy, due to using instrumentation. The inaccuracy will cause
that some bugs are caught much later than when they actually occur, which makes it hard to find
the root cause of the bug. The following C code gives a simple example.
int x, *p;
/* assume invariant: x == 1 */
...
p = foo(); /* a bug: p points to x incorrectly */
*p = 5; /* line A: unintended corruption of x */
...
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InvariantCheck(x == 1); /* line B */
z = Array[x];
...
While x is corrupted in line A, the bug is not detected until the invariant check at line B. Due to
the difficulty of performing perfect pointer disambiguation, it may be hard for a dynamic checker
to know that it needs to insert an invariant check right after line A.
To assist software debugging, several processor architectures such as Intel x86 and Sun SPARC
provide support for watchpoints to monitor several programmer-specified memory locations [Int01,
KH92, SPA92, WLG93]. When a watched memory location is accessed, the hardware triggers an
exception that is handled by the debugger. It is then up to the programmer to manually check the
program state. While watchpoints are a good starting point, they have several limitations. First,
they do not support low-overhead checks on variable values automatically. Since exceptions are
expensive, it would be very inefficient to use them for dynamic bug detection during production
runs. Second, most architectures only support a handful of watchpoints (four in Intel x86). There-
fore, it is hard to use watchpoints for dynamic monitoring in production runs, which requires
efficiency and watching many memory locations.
As micro-architectural innovations have significantly improved performance, interest has re-
cently risen in the architecture community to use transistors to improve software debugging. Sev-
eral works [PT03, XBH03, NPC05, TCV04] have been conducted along this direction. While
recent work is promising and provides a good foundation, it is still far from providing a complete
solution.
This chapter introduces the Intelligent Watcher (iWatcher), a novel architectural framework to
monitor dynamic execution automatically, flexibly and with minimal overhead. iWatcher asso-
ciates program-specified monitoring functions with memory locations. When any such location is
accessed, the monitoring function is automatically triggered with low overhead. To further reduce
overhead and support rollback, iWatcher can optionally leverage Thread-Level Speculation (TLS).
The main advantages of iWatcher are:
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• It monitors all accesses to the watched memory locations. Consequently, it catches hard-
to-find bugs such as updates through aliased pointers and stack-smashing attacks commonly
exploited by viruses.
• It has low overhead because it (i) only monitors memory instructions that truly access the
watched memory locations, and (ii) uses minimal-overhead hardware-supported triggering
of monitoring functions.
• It is general and flexible in that it can support a wide range of checks, including program-
specific checks. Therefore, iWatcher can be used to build detection tools covering variety of
bugs. Moreover, iWatcher is language independent, cross-module and cross-developer.
• It can optionally leverage TLS to hide monitoring overhead and provide rollback support.
Specifically, with TLS, a monitoring function is executed in parallel with the rest of the
program, and the program can be rolled back if a bug is found.
In contrast, due to aliasing problems, it is very hard for software-only dynamic checkers to
monitor all accesses to the watched memory locations and only those.
We evaluate iWatcher using seven buggy applications with various real and injected bugs in-
cluding accessing freed locations, memory leaks, buffer overflow, value-invariant violations, and
smashed stacks. iWatcher detects all the bugs evaluated in our experiments with only a 0.1-179%
execution overhead. Overall, iWatcher’s reasonably small overhead and ability to monitor many
memory locations enable it to be used in both in-house testing and production runs. In contrast, a
well-known open-source bug detector called Valgrind induces orders of magnitude more overhead,
and can only detect a subset of the bugs. Moreover, even with 20% of the dynamic loads moni-
tored in a program, iWatcher only adds 72-182% overhead. We also show that TLS is effective at
reducing overheads for programs with substantial monitoring. Finally, supporting four contexts in
an SMT is enough to achieve the best performance in our experiments.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 describe
iWatcher’s functionality, architectural design, and advantages, respectively. Section 3.5 describes
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how to use iWatcher to detect various bugs. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 present the evaluation methodol-
ogy and experimental results. Section 3.8 summarizes this chapter.
3.2 iWatcher Functionality
iWatcher provides high-flexibility and low-overhead dynamic execution monitoring. It associates
program-specified monitoring functions with memory locations. When any such location is ac-
cessed, the monitoring function associated with it is automatically triggered and executed.
iWatcher provides two system calls to turn on and off monitoring on a memory location, namely
iWatcherOn and iWatcherOff. These calls can be inserted in programs either automatically by an
instrumentation tool or manually by programmers. The following is the iWatcherOn interface:
iWatcherOn(MemAddr, Length, WatchFlag, ReactMode,
MonitorFunc, Param1, Param2, ... ParamN)
/* MemAddr: starting address of the memory region*/
/* Length: length of the memory region */
/* WatchFlag: types of accesses to be monitored */
/* ReactMode: reaction mode */
/* MonitorFunc: monitoring function */
/* Param1...ParamN: parameters of MonitorFunc */
If a program makes such a call, iWatcher associates monitoring function MonitorFunc()
with a memory region of Length bytes starting at MemAddr. The WatchF lag specifies what
types of accesses to this memory region should be monitored. Its value can be “READONLY”,
“WRITEONLY”, or “READWRITE”, in which case the monitoring function is triggered on a read
access, write access or both, respectively.
At a triggering access (an access to a monitored memory location), the hardware automatically
initiates the monitoring function associated with this memory location. The architecture passes
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the values of Param1 through ParamN to the monitoring function. In addition, it also passes
information about the triggering access, including the program counter, the type of access (load or
store; word, half-word, or byte access), reaction mode, and the memory location being accessed.
It is the monitoring function’s responsibility to perform the check.
A monitoring function can have side effects and can read and write variables without any
restrictions. To avoid recursive triggering of monitoring functions, no memory access performed
inside a monitoring function can trigger another monitoring function.
From the programmers’ point of view, the execution of a monitoring function follows sequen-
tial semantics, just like a very lightweight exception handler (Section 3.3 describes why monitoring
in iWatcher is very lightweight). The semantic order is: the triggering access, the monitoring func-
tion, and the rest of the program after the triggering access.
Upon successful completion of a monitoring function, the program continues normally. If the
monitoring function fails (returns FALSE), different actions are taken depending on the ReactMode
parameter specified in iWatcherOn(). iWatcher supports three modes: ReportMode, BreakMode
and RollbackMode:
• ReportMode: The outcome of the check is reported and the program continues. This mode
can be used for profiling and error reporting without interfering with the execution of the
program.
• BreakMode: The program pauses at the state right after the triggering access and control is
passed to an exception handler. Users can potentially attach an interactive debugger, which
can be used to find more information.
• RollbackMode: The program rolls back to the most recent checkpoint, typically much be-
fore the triggering access. This mode can be used to support replay of a code section to
analyze an occurring bug [PT03], or to support transaction-based programming [OL02].
A program can associate multiple monitoring functions with the same location. In this case,
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upon an access to the watched location, all monitoring functions are executed following sequential
semantics according to their setup order.
When a program is no longer interested in monitoring a memory region, it turns off the moni-
toring using
iWatcherOff(MemAddr, Length, WatchFlag, MonitorFunc)
/* MemAddr: starting address of the watched region*/
/* Length: length of the watched region */
/* WatchFlag: types of accesses to be unmonitored */
/* MonitorFunc: the monitoring function */
After this operation, the MonitorFunc associated with this memory region of Length bytes
starting at MemAddr and WatchF lag is deleted from the system. Other monitoring functions
associated with this region are still in effect.
Besides using the iWatcherOff() call to turn off monitoring for a specified memory region, the
program can also use a MonitorF lag global switch that enables or disables monitoring on all
watched locations. This switch is useful when monitoring overhead is a concern. When the switch
is disabled, no location is watched and the overhead imposed is negligible.
Note that iWatcher only provides a very flexible mechanism for dynamic execution monitor-
ing. It is not iWatcher’s responsibility to ensure that a monitoring function is written correctly,
just like an assert(condition) call cannot guarantee that the condition in the code is correct. Pro-
grammers can use invariant-inferring tools such as DIDUCE [HL02] and DAIKON [ECGN00] to
automatically insert iWatcherOn() and iWatcherOff() calls into programs.
With this support, we can rewrite the example of Section 3.1 using iWatcherOn() and iWatcherOff()
operations. There is no need to insert the invariant check. iWatcherOn() is inserted at the very be-
ginning of the program so that the system can continuously check x’s value whenever and however
the memory location is accessed. This way, the bug is caught at line A.
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int x, *p;
/* assume invariant: x = 1 */
iWatcherOn(&x, sizeof(int), READWRITE,
BreakMode, &MonitorX, &x, 1);
...
p = foo(); /* a bug: p points to x incorrectly */
*p = 5; /* line A: a triggering access */
...
z = Array[x]; /* line B: a triggering access */
...
iWatcherOff(&x, sizeof(int), READWRITE, &MonitorX);
bool MonitorX(int *x, int value){
return (*x == value);
}
3.3 Architectural Design of iWatcher
To implement the functionality described above, there are at least four challenges: (1) How to
monitor a location? (2) How to detect a triggering access? (3) How to trigger a monitoring func-
tion? (4) How to support the three reaction modes? In this section, we first give an overview of the
implementation and then show how it addresses these challenges.
3.3.1 Overview of the Implementation
iWatcher is implemented using a combination of hardware and software. Logically, it has four
main parts. First, to detect triggering accesses on small monitored memory regions, we tag cache
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Figure 3.1: iWatcher hardware architecture.
lines in both L1 and L2 caches with WatchFlags; to detect triggering accesses on large moni-
tored memory regions, we use a small Range Watch Table (RWT). Second, the hardware triggers
monitoring functions on the fly and provides a special Main check function register to store the
common entry point for all monitoring functions. Third, we use software to manage the associa-
tions between watched locations and monitoring functions. Finally, we optionally leverage TLS to
reduce overheads.
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the iWatcher hardware. Each L1 and L2 cache line is aug-
mented with WatchFlags. They identify words belonging to small monitored memory regions.
There are two WatchFlag bits per word in the line: a read-monitoring one and a write-monitoring
one. If the read (write)-monitoring bit is set for a word, all loads (stores) to this word automatically
trigger the corresponding monitoring function. The processor also has a Main check function reg-
ister that holds the address of the Main check function(), which is the common entry point to all
program-specified monitoring functions. In addition, iWatcher also has a Victim WatchFlag Table
(VWT), which stores the WatchFlags for watched lines of small regions that have at some point
been displaced from L2.
To detect accesses to large (multiple pages) monitored memory regions, iWatcher uses a set
of registers organized in the RWT. Each RWT entry stores the start and end virtual addresses of
a large region being monitored, plus two bits of WatchFlags and one valid bit. We will see that
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the RWT is used to prevent large monitored regions from overflowing the L2 cache and the VWT.
The lines of these regions are not brought into the cache on an iWatcherOn() call. Moreover, the
WatchFlags of these lines do not need to be set in the L1 or L2 cache unless the lines are also
included in a small monitored region. When the RWT is full, additional large monitored regions
are treated the same way as small regions.
The software component of iWatcher includes the iWatcherOn/Off() system calls, which set
or remove associations of memory locations with monitoring functions. iWatcher uses a software
table called Check Table to store detailed monitoring information for each watched memory loca-
tion. The information stored includes MemAddr, Length, WatchFlag, ReactMode, MonitorFunc,
and Parameters. Using software simplifies the hardware. An iWatcherOn/Off() call adds or re-
moves the corresponding entry to or from the Check Table.
The iWatcher software also implements the Main check function() library call, whose start-
ing address is stored in the Main check function register. When a triggering access occurs, the
hardware sets the program counter to the address in this register. The Main check function() is
responsible to call the program-specified monitoring function(s) associated with the accessed lo-
cation. To do this, it needs to search the Check Table and find the corresponding function(s).
To reduce monitoring overhead, iWatcher can optionally leverage TLS to speculatively execute
the main program in parallel with monitoring functions. Moreover, iWatcher can also leverage
TLS to roll back the buggy code with low overhead, for subsequent replay.
While TLS was also used by Oplinger and Lam to hide overheads [OL02], iWatcher uses a dif-
ferent TLS spawning mechanism. Specifically, iWatcher uses dynamic hardware spawning, which
requires no code instrumentation. Oplinger and Lam, instead, insert thread-spawning instructions
in the program statically. In general, their approach is less efficient and may hurt some conventional
compiler optimizations. Many of the new issues that appear with dynamic hardware spawning are
discussed in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.
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3.3.2 Watching a Range of Addresses
When a program calls iWatcherOn() for a memory region equal or larger than LargeRegion, iWatcher
tries to allocate an RWT entry for this region. If there is already an entry for this region in the RWT,
iWatcherOn() sets the entry’s WatchFlags to the logical OR of its old value and the WatchFlag ar-
gument of the call. If, instead, the region to be monitored is smaller than LargeRegion, iWatcher
loads the watched memory lines into the L2 cache (if they are not already in L2). We do not explic-
itly load the lines into L1 to avoid unnecessarily polluting L1. As a line is loaded from memory,
iWatcher accesses the VWT to read-in the old WatchFlags, if they exist there. Then, it sets the
WatchFlag bits in the L2 line to be the logical OR of the WatchFlag argument of the call and the
old WatchFlags. If the line is already present in L2 and possibly L1, iWatcher simply sets the
WatchFlag bits in the line to the logical OR of the WatchFlag argument and the current WatchFlag.
In all cases, iWatcherOn() also adds the monitoring function to the Check Table.
When a program calls iWatcherOff(), iWatcher removes the corresponding monitoring function
entry from the Check Table. Moreover, if the monitored region is large and there is a corresponding
RWT entry, iWatcherOff() updates this RWT entry’s WatchFlags. The new value of the WatchFlags
is computed from the remaining monitoring functions associated with this memory region, accord-
ing to the information in the Check Table. If there is no remaining monitoring function for this
range, the RWT entry is invalidated. If, instead, the memory region is small, iWatcher finds all the
lines of the region that are currently cached and updates their WatchFlags based on the remaining
monitoring functions. iWatcher also updates (and, if appropriately removes) any corresponding
VWT entries.
Caches and VWT are addressed by the physical addresses of watched memory regions. If there
is no paging by the OS, the mapping between physical and virtual addresses is fixed for the whole
program execution. In our prototype implementation, we assume that watched memory locations
are pinned by the OS, so that the page mappings of a watched region do not change until the
monitoring for this region is disabled using iWatcherOff().
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Note that the purpose of using RWT for large regions is to reduce L2 pollution and VWT space
consumption: lines from this region will only be cached when referenced (not during iWatcherOn())
and, since they will not set their WatchFlags in the cache, they will not use space in the VWT on
cache eviction.
It is possible that iWatcherOn()/iWatcherOff() access some memory locations sometimes as
part of a large region and sometimes as a small region. In this case, the iWatcherOn() or iWatcherOff()
software handlers, as they add or remove entries to or from the Check Table, are responsible for
ensuring the consistency between RWT entries and L2/VWT WatchFlags.
3.3.3 Detecting Triggering Accesses
iWatcher needs to identify those loads and stores that should trigger monitoring functions. A load
or store is a triggering access if the accessed location is inside any large monitored region recorded
in the RWT, or the WatchFlags of the accessed line in L1/L2 are set.
In practice, the process of detecting a triggering access is complicated by the fact that mod-
ern out-of-order processors introduce access reordering and pipelining. To help in this process,
iWatcher augments each reorder buffer (ROB) entry with a Trigger bit, and each load-store queue
entry with 2 bits that store WatchFlag information.
To keep the hardware reasonably simple, the execution of a monitoring function should only
occur when a triggering load or store reaches the head of the ROB. At that point, the values of
the architectural registers that need to be passed to the monitoring function are readily available.
In addition, the memory system is consistent, as it contains the effect of all preceding stores.
Moreover, there is no danger of mispredicted branches or exceptions, which could require the
cancellation of an early-triggered monitoring function.
For a load or store, when the TLB is looked up early in the pipeline, the hardware also checks
the RWT for a match. This introduces negligible visible delay. If there is a match, the access is a
triggering one. If there is no match, the WatchFlags in the caches will be examined to determine if
it is a triggering access.
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A load typically accesses the memory system before reaching the head of the ROB. It is at
that time that a triggering load will detect the set WatchFlags in the cache. Consequently, in our
design, as a load reads the data from the cache into the load queue, it also reads the WatchFlag bits
into the special storage provided in the load queue entry. In addition, if the RWT or the WatchFlag
bits indicate that the load is a triggering one, the Trigger bit associated with the load’s ROB entry
is set. When the load (or any instruction) finally reaches the head of the ROB and is about to retire,
the hardware checks the Trigger bit. If it is set, the hardware triggers the corresponding monitoring
function.
Stores present a special difficulty. A store is not sent to the memory system until it reaches the
head of the ROB. At that point, it is retired immediately, but it may still cause a cache miss, in
which case it may take a long time to actually complete. In iWatcher, this would mean that, for
stores that do not hit in the RWT, the processor may have to wait a long time to know whether it is
a triggering access. During that time, no subsequent instruction could be retired, as the processor
may have to trigger a monitoring function. To reduce this delay as much as possible, we change
the microarchitecture so that, as soon as a store address is resolved early in the ROB, a prefetch
is issued to the memory system. Such prefetch brings the data into the cache, and the WatchFlag
bits are read into the special storage in the store queue entry. If the RWT or the WatchFlag bits in
the caches indicate that the store is a triggering one, the Trigger bit in the ROB entry is also set.
With this support, the processor is much less likely to have to wait when the store reaches the head
of the ROB. While issuing this prefetch may have implications for the memory consistency model
supported in a multiprocessor environment, we consider the topic to be beyond the scope of this
chapter.
Note that bringing the WatchFlag information into the load-store queue entries enables correct
operation for loads that get their data directly from the load-store queue. For example, if a store in
the load-store queue has the read-monitoring WatchFlag bit set, then a load that reads from it will
set its own Trigger bit.
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3.3.4 Executing Monitoring Functions
When a triggering load or store is retired, the architectural registers and the program counter are
automatically saved, and execution is redirected to the address in the Main check function register.
After the monitoring function completes, execution resumes from the saved program counter.
As an optimization, we can leverage the TLS mechanism. Specifically, when a triggering load
or store is retired, the iWatcher hardware automatically spawns a new microthread (denoted as
microthread 1 in Figure 3.2(a)) to speculatively execute the rest of the program after the trigger-
ing access, while the current microthread (denoted as microthread 0 in Figure 3.2(a)) executes the
monitoring function non-speculatively. To provide sequential semantics (the remainder of the pro-
gram is semantically after the monitoring function), data dependencies are tracked by TLS and any
violation of sequential semantics results in the squash of the speculative microthread (microthread
1).
(a) Executing a monitoring
function.
(b) Triggering a monitoring
function from a speculative
microthread.
Figure 3.2: Examples of monitoring function execution with TLS support.
Microthread 0 executes the monitoring function by starting from the address stored in the
Main check function register. It is the responsibility of the Main check function() to find the
monitoring function(s) associated with the triggering access and call all such function(s) one after
another. Note that, although semantically, a monitoring function appears to programmers like a
user-specified exception handler, the overhead of triggering a monitoring function is tiny with our
hardware support. Indeed, while triggering an exception handler typically needs OS involvement,
triggering a monitoring function in iWatcher is done completely in hardware: the hardware auto-
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matically fetches the first instruction from the Main check function(). iWatcher can skip the OS
because monitoring functions are not related to any resource management in the system and, in
addition, do not need to be executed in privileged mode. Moreover, the monitoring functions for
a program are in the same address space as the monitored program. Therefore, a “bad” program
cannot use iWatcher to mess up other programs.
Microthread 1 speculatively executes the continuation of the monitoring function, i.e., the re-
mainder of the program after the triggering access. To avoid the overhead of flushing the pipeline,
iWatcher dynamically changes the microthread ID of all the instructions currently in the pipeline
from 0 to 1. Note that, it is possible that some un-retired load instructions after the triggering
access may have already accessed the data in the cache and, as per TLS, already updated the mi-
crothread ID in the cache line to be 0. Since the microthread ID on these cache lines should now
be 1, the hardware re-touches the cache lines that were read by these un-retired loads, correctly
setting their microthread IDs to 1. There is no such problem for stores because they only update
the microthread IDs in the cache at retirement. In our experiments, these retouches account for
a very tiny fraction of all accesses, and practically always hit the L1 cache. So the performance
impact is negligible.
It is possible that a speculative microthread issues a triggering access, as shown on Figure 3.2(b).
In this case, a more speculative microthread (microthread 2) is spawned to execute the rest of the
program, while the speculative microthread (microthread 1) enters the Main check function. Since
microthread 2 is semantically after microthread 1, a violation of sequential semantics will result in
the squash of microthread 2. In addition, if microthread 1 is squashed, microthread 2 is squashed
as well. Finally, if microthread 1 completes while speculative, iWatcher does not commit it; it can
only be committed after microthread 1 becomes safe.
Note that, in a CMP-based iWatcher, microthreads should be allocated for cache affinity. In our
Figure 3.2(a) example, speculative microthread 1 should be kept on the same CPU as the original
program, while microthread 0 should be moved to a different CPU. This is because microthread 1
continues to execute the program and is likely to reuse cache state.
30
3.3.5 Different Reaction Modes
(a) ReportMode. (b) BreakMode. (c) RollbackMode.
Figure 3.3: Different reaction modes supported by iWatcher with the TLS optimization.
If a monitoring function fails, iWatcher takes different actions depending on the corresponding
ReactMode. ReactMode can be ReportMode, BreakMode, and RollbackMode.
In ReportMode, the outcome of the check is reported and the program continues. This mode is
used for profiling and error reporting without interfering with the execution of the program.
In BreakMode, the program pauses at the state right after the triggering access, and control
passes to an exception handler. Users can attach an interactive debugger, which can be used to find
more information.
Finally, in RollbackMode, the program rolls back to a previous checkpoint, typically much
earlier than the triggering access. This mode can be used to support the replay of a code section to
analyze a bug, or to support transaction-based programming.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the three supported reaction modes with the TLS optimization. Report-
Mode is the simplest one. iWatcher treats it the same way as if the monitoring function had
succeeded: microthread 0 commits and microthread 1 becomes safe. If the reaction mode is
BreakMode, iWatcher commits microthread 0 but squashes microthread 1. The program state
and the program counter (PC) of microthread 1 are restored to the state it had immediately after
the triggering access (Figure 3.3(b)). The cache updates of microthread 1 are discarded. At this
point, programmers can use an interactive debugger to analyze the bug.
If the reaction mode is RollbackMode, iWatcher squashes microthread 1 and also rolls back
microthread 0 to a previous checkpoint (the checkpoint at PC in Figure 3.3(c)). iWatcher can use
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the support similar to ReEnact [PT03] to provide this reaction mode.
3.3.6 Other Issues
Displacements and Cache Misses When a watched line of small regions is about to be displaced
from the L2 cache, its WatchFlags are saved in the VWT. The VWT is a small set-associative
buffer. If the VWT needs to take an entry while full, it selects a victim entry to be evicted, and
delivers an exception. The OS then turns on page protections for the pages that correspond to the
WatchFlags to be evicted from the VWT. Future accesses to these pages will trigger page protection
faults, which will enable the OS to insert their WatchFlags back into the VWT. However, in our
experiments, we find that a 1024-entry VWT is never full. The reason is that the VWT only keeps
the WatchFlags for watched lines of small regions that have at some point been displaced from L2.
On an L2 cache miss, as the line is read from memory, the VWT is checked for an address
match. If there is a match, the WatchFlags for the line are copied to the destination location in
the cache. We do not remove the WatchFlags from the VWT because the memory access may be
speculative and be eventually undone. If there is no match, the WatchFlags for the loaded line are
set to the default “un-watched” value. Note that this VWT lookup is performed in parallel with the
memory read and, therefore, introduces negligible visible delay.
If TLS is used, speculative lines cannot be displaced from the L2. If space is needed in a cache
set that only holds speculative lines, a speculative microthread is squashed to make room. More
details can be found in [PT03].
Check Table Implementation The Check Table is a software table. Our current implementation
uses one entry for each watched region. The entries are sorted by start address. To speed-up Check
Table lookup, we exploit memory access locality to reduce the number of table entries accessed
during one search. A table entry contains all arguments of the iWatcherOn() call. If there are
multiple monitoring functions associated with the same location, they are linked together. Since
the Check Table is a pure software data structure, it is easy to change its implementation. For
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example, a possible implementation could be to organize it as a hash table. It can be hashed with
the virtual address of the watched location.
3.4 Advantages of iWatcher
Based on the previous discussion, we can list the advantages of iWatcher. One of them is that it
provides location-controlled monitoring. Therefore, all accesses to a watched memory location
are monitored, including “disguised” accesses due to dangling pointers or wrong pointer manipu-
lations.
Another advantage of iWatcher is its low overhead. iWatcher only monitors memory opera-
tions that truly access a watched memory location. Moreover, iWatcher uses hardware to trigger
monitoring functions with minimal overhead. Finally, iWatcher optionally uses TLS to execute
monitoring functions in parallel with the rest of the program, effectively hiding most of the moni-
toring overhead.
iWatcher is flexible and extensible. Programmers or automatic instrumentation tools can add
monitoring functions. iWatcher is convenient even for manual instrumentation because program-
mers do not need to instrument every possible access to a watched memory location. Instead, they
only need to insert an iWatcherOn() call for a location when they are interested in monitoring this
location and an iWatcherOff() call when the monitoring is no longer needed. In between, all pos-
sible accesses to this location are automatically monitored. In addition, iWatcher supports three
reaction modes, giving flexibility to the system.
iWatcher is cross-module and cross-developer. A watched location inserted by one module or
one developer is automatically honored by all modules and all developers whenever the watched
location is accessed.
iWatcher is language independent since it is supported directly in hardware. Programs written
in any language, including C/C++, Java or other languages can use iWatcher. For the same rea-
son, iWatcher can also support dynamic monitoring of low-level system software, including the
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Feature Assertions Hardware
Watchpoints
Software-Only Dynamic Checkers iWatcher
Valgrind Generic
Hardware sup-
port
No Simple No No Modest. Op-
tionally, TLS
Type of checks Code-
controlled
Location-
controlled
Code-
controlled
Code-
controlled
Location-
controlled
Reaction
modes
Abort Interrupt Report or
break
Report or
break
Report, break
or rollback
Programmer’s
effort
High High Low Low Moderate
or low (au-
tomatic
instrumenta-
tion)
Language
dependent
No No No Typically
yes
No
Flexibility Very
flexible.
Program
specific
Inflexible. Sup-
port only a few
watchpoints.
Rely on pro-
grammers or
debuggers for
checks
Moderately
flexible.
Currently,
it only sup-
ports limited
types of
checks
Moderately
flexible
Very flexible.
Program spe-
cific
Cross-module
and cross-
developer
No Yes Yes No Yes
Completeness Hard to
make sure
all accesses
are checked
Detects all ac-
cesses
Detects all
accesses
May miss
some ac-
cesses due
to aliasing
problems
Detects all
accesses
Overhead High Low Very high Typically
high
Low
Table 3.1: Comparison of iWatcher to three other approaches. Completeness refers to whether
an approach monitors all accesses to a watched memory location by construction. Examples of
software-only dynamic checkers include Purify, DIDUCE, Eraser, etc.
operating system.
iWatcher can be used to detect illegal accesses to a memory location. For example, it can be
used for security checks to prevent illegal accesses to some secured memory locations. In our
experiments, we have used iWatcher to protect the return address in a program stack to detect
stack-smashing attacks [CPM+98, FS01, One96, XKPI02].
Table 3.1 summarizes the differences between iWatcher and the three related approaches dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.
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3.5 Bug Detection
To detect bugs, programmers and some software debugging tools like DIDUCE [HL02] need to use
specific monitoring functions. In this section, to demonstrate how to write monitoring functions
for iWatcher, we describe some monitoring functions that are used in our experiments to detect
various bugs, including buffer overflow, memory leaks, stack smashing, accessing freed memory,
and invariant violations.
(1) Detecting Buffer Overflow (BO check): To detect buffer overflow for both dynamic
buffers and static arrays, some paddings are added at the two ends of each buffer. The padding
areas are then monitored by iWatcher. The monitoring function simply reports any accesses to
these padding areas as bugs. It may miss some bugs if the out-of-bound access does not hit the
padding areas. When a dynamic buffer is deallocated, its paddings are also freed and the corre-
sponding monitoring is turned off.
(2) Detecting Memory Leaks (ML check): Memory leak bugs are tackled by monitoring
all accesses to heap objects. Each heap access triggers the monitoring function, which updates
the time-stamp associated with the accessed object. The monitoring is turned off when an object
is deallocated. Periodically, the time-stamps are checked. The heap objects that have not been
accessed for a long time are likely to be memory leaks. Those objects are then ranked based on
their time-stamps.
(3) Detecting Accesses to Freed Locations (FREE check): All unallocated memory space in
the heap is monitored using iWatcher. Any access to this space triggers the monitoring function
that reports it as a bug. When a memory region is allocated, the monitoring for this memory region
is turned off. Of course, the monitor may miss bugs in some cases, such as a dangling pointer
points to a reallocated location.
(4) Detecting Various Memory Bugs (COMBO check): This is used to catch all the above
three types of bugs. The monitoring function is combination of the above three functions.
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(5) Detecting Stack Smashing (STACK check): To catch stack smashing bugs that are com-
monly exploited by viruses to launch security attacks, iWatcher monitors every stack location that
stores return addresses. More specifically, after entering a function, iWatcherOn() is called on
the return address location, and before the function returns, iWatcherOff() is called to turn off the
monitoring to this location. The monitoring function, if triggered, simply reports any access as a
bug.
(6) Detecting Invariant Violations (IV check): To detect an invariant violation, the specific
variable needs to be monitored. The monitoring function checks if the variable value satisfies the
program-specific invariant.
The first five are general checks. The monitoring can be fully automated using a tool to insert
the monitors into any programs. The last check is a program-specific monitoring, requiring specific
knowledge about the program semantics.
Monitoring dynamic objects is done by wrapping the memory allocation and deallocation func-
tions to insert iWatcherOn() and iWatcherOff() calls. For monitoring static arrays, the paddings
and iWatcherOn/Off() calls are added manually now, although they can be done automatically with
compiler support. For STACK check, we use the compiler support to identify the stack location
that stores the return address and add the iWatcherOn/Off() calls. The iWatcherOn/Off() calls
for IV check are inserted manually now, but can be automated using tools such as DAIKON and
DIDUCE.
3.6 Evaluation Methodology
3.6.1 Simulated Architecture
To evaluate iWatcher, we have built an execution-driven simulator that models a workstation with
a 4-context SMT processor augmented with TLS support and iWatcher functionality. The experi-
ments are conducted on this default architecture unless specifically mentioned. The parameters of
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the architecture are shown in Table 3.2. We model the overhead of spawning a monitoring-function
microthread as 5 cycles of processor stall visible to the main-program thread. The reaction mode
used in all experiments is ReportMode, so that all programs can run to completion.
CPU frequency 2.4GHz ROB size 360
Fetch width 16 I-window size 160
Issue width 8 Int FUs 6
Retire width 12 Mem FUs 4
Ld/st queue entries 32/thread FP FUs 4
Spawn overhead 5 cycles Reaction mode ReportMode
L1 cache 32KB, 4-way, 32B/line, 3 cycles latency
L2 cache 1MB, 8-way, 32B/line, 10 cycles latency
VWT 1024 entries, 8-way, 2B/entry
LargeRegion 64Kbytes
RWT 4 entries, 32bits for the start and end addresses
Memory 200 cycles latency
Table 3.2: Parameters of the simulated architecture. Latencies are given as unloaded round-trips
from the processor.
To isolate the benefits of TLS, we evaluate the same architecture without TLS support. In
this case, on a triggering access, the processor first executes the monitoring function, and then
proceeds to execute the rest of the program. For the evaluation without TLS support (with or
without iWatcher support), the single microthread running is given a 64-entry load-store queue.
To study TLS scalability, we vary the number of contexts from 2 to 8 in the SMT machine,
using the same number of shared resources as listed in Table 3.2. The number of contexts limits
the maximum number of concurrently running microthreads.
3.6.2 Valgrind
In our evaluation, we compare the functionality and overhead of iWatcher to Valgrind [NS03], an
open-source memory debugger for x86 programs. We choose Valgrind because it does not require
modifying the tested applications and is publicly available. Valgrind is a binary-code dynamic
checker to detect general memory-related bugs such as memory leaks, memory corruption and
buffer overflow. It simulates every single instruction of a program. Because of this, it finds errors
not only in the user code but also in all supporting dynamically-linked libraries. Valgrind takes
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control of a program before it starts. The program is then run on a synthetic x86 CPU, and every
memory access is checked. All detected errors are reported.
Valgrind provides an option to enable or disable memory leak detection. We also enhance
Valgrind to enable or disable variable uninitialization checks and invalid memory access checks
(checks for buffer overflow and invalid accesses to freed memory locations).
In our experiments, we run Valgrind on a real machine with a 2.6 GHz Pentium 4 processor,
32-Kbyte L1 cache, 2-Mbyte L2 cache, and 1-Gbyte main memory. Since iWatcher runs on a sim-
ulator, we cannot compare the absolute execution time of iWatcher with that of Valgrind. Instead,
we compare their relative execution overheads over runs without monitoring.
3.6.3 Tested Applications
We have conducted two sets of experiments. The first one uses seven applications with both
injected and real bugs to evaluate the functionality and overheads of iWatcher for software de-
bugging. The second one systematically evaluates the overheads of iWatcher and the effect of
architecture resources when monitoring applications without bugs.
The applications used in our first set of experiments contain various bugs, including memory
leaks, accesses to freed locations, buffer overflow, stack-smashing attacks, and value invariant
violations. These applications are: bc-1.06 (an arbitrary precision calculator language), gzip-1.2.4
(GNU zip, a popular compression utility provided by the GNU project), polymorph-0.4.0 (a tool
to convert Windows style file names to something more portable for UNIX systems), ncompress-
4.2.4 (a compression and decompression utility that is compatible with the original UNIX compress
utility), tar-1.13.25 (a tool to create and manipulate tar archives), cachelib (a cache management
library developed at the University of Illinois), and gzip (a SPECINT 2000 application running the
Test input data set). Of these programs, bc-1.06, gzip-1.2.4, polymorph-0.4.0, ncompress-4.2.4,
tar-1.13.25 and cachelib already had real bugs (the bugs come with the code and were introduced
by the original programmers), while we injected some common bugs into gzip.
Table 3.3 shows the details of the bugs and monitoring functions, as described in Section 3.5.
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Application Type of Mon-
itoring
Bug Class, Location, and Origin Monitoring
Function
gzip-
STACK
general stack smashing: “huft free()”. Injected STACK -
check
gzip-
FREE
general accessing freed location: “huft free()”.
Injected
FREE -
check
gzip-BO1 general dynamic buffer overflow: “huft build()”.
Injected
BO check
gzip-ML general memory leak: “huft free()”. Injected ML check
gzip-
COMBO
general combination of the bugs in gzip-ML,
gzip-FREE, and gzip-BO1. Injected
COMBO -
check
gzip-BO2 general static array overflow: “huft build()”. In-
jected
BO check
gzip-IV1 program spe-
cific
value invariant violation: “huft build()”.
Injected
IV check
gzip-IV2 program spe-
cific
value invariant violation: “inflate()”. In-
jected
IV check
cachelib program spe-
cific
value invariant violation at option.c:line
90. Real
IV check
bc-1.06 general dynamic buffer overflow at storage.c:line
176 and util.c:line 557. Real
BO check
ncompress-
4.2.4
general stack smashing at compress42.c:line 886.
Real
STACK -
check
gzip-1.2.4 general static array overflow at gzip.c:line 1009.
Real
BO check
polymorph-
0.4.0
general stack smashing at polymorph.c:line 193
and 200. Real
STACK -
check
tar-
1.13.25
general dynamic buffer overflow at pre-
gargs.c:line 92. Real
BO check
Table 3.3: Bugs and monitoring functions. The applications with name in bold are new relative to
[Zhou et al. 2004].
We evaluate the case of single type of bugs: stack-smashing, accessing freed location, buffer over-
flow (dynamic buffer overflow and static array overflow), memory leak, and value-invariant viola-
tions. We also evaluate the case of a combination of bugs (memory leak, accessing a freed location,
and dynamic buffer overflow). Table 3.3 shows the bug information and monitoring functions.
For fair comparison between Valgrind and iWatcher, in Valgrind we enable only the type of
checks that are necessary to detect the bug(s) in the corresponding application. For example, for
gzip-ML, we enable only the memory leak checks. Similarly, for gzip-FREE, gzip-BO1, bc-1.06
and tar-1.13.25, we enable only the invalid memory access checks. In all our experiments, variable
uninitialization checks are always disabled.
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Finally, our second set of experiments evaluates iWatcher overheads and the effect of ar-
chitecture resources (microthread contexts) by monitoring memory accesses in two unmodified
SPECINT 2000 applications running the Test input data set. These applications are gzip and parser.
We first measure the overhead for iWatcher with a default 4-context SMT processor and without
TLS, as we vary the percentage of dynamic loads monitored by iWatcher and the length of the
monitoring function. Then, we measure the iWatcher overheads with different numbers (namely 2,
4, 6 and 8) of microthread contexts in the SMT processor.
3.7 Experimental Results
3.7.1 Overall Results
Table 3.4 compares the effectiveness and the overhead of Valgrind and iWatcher. For each of the
buggy applications considered, the table shows whether the schemes detect the bug and, if so, the
overhead they add to the program’s execution time. Recall from Section 3.6 that Valgrind’s times
are measured on a real machine, while iWatcher’s are simulated.
Application Valgrind iWatcher
Bug Detected? Overhead (%) Bug Detected? Overhead (%)
gzip-STACK No - Yes 80.0
gzip-FREE Yes 1466 Yes 8.7
gzip-BO1 Yes 1514 Yes 10.4
gzip-ML Yes 936 Yes 37.1
gzip-COMBO Yes 1650 Yes 42.7
gzip-BO2 No - Yes 10.5
gzip-IV1 No - Yes 10.5
gzip-IV2 No - Yes 9.6
cachelib No - Yes 3.8
bc-1.06 Yes 7367 Yes 178.9
ncompress-4.2.4 No - Yes 2.4
gzip-1.2.4 No - Yes 168.3
polymorph-0.4.0 No - Yes 0.1
tar-1.13.25 Yes 132 Yes 3.8
Table 3.4: Comparing the effectiveness and overhead of Valgrind and iWatcher.
Consider effectiveness first. Valgrind can detect accessing freed locations, dynamic buffer
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overflow, memory leak bugs, and the combination of them. iWatcher, instead, detects all the bugs
considered. iWatcher’s effectiveness is largely due to its flexibility to specialize the monitoring
function, and its low-overhead that enables more sophisticated monitoring functionality.
The table also shows that iWatcher has a much lower overhead than Valgrind. For bugs that
can be detected by both schemes, iWatcher only adds 4-179% overhead, a factor of 25-169 smaller
than Valgrind. For example, in gzip-COMBO, where both iWatcher and Valgrind monitor every
access to dynamically-allocated memory, iWatcher only adds 43% overhead, which is 39 times less
than Valgrind. iWatcher’s low overhead is the result of triggering monitoring functions only when
the watched locations are actually accessed, and of using TLS to hide monitoring overheads. The
difference in overhead between Valgrind and iWatcher is larger in gzip-FREE, where we are look-
ing for a pointer that de-references a freed-up location. In this case, iWatcher only monitors freed
memory buffers, and any triggering access uncovers the bug. As a result, iWatcher’s overhead is
169 times smaller than Valgrind’s. Similarly, for bc-1.06 and tar-1.13.25, the iWatcher’s overheads
are 41 and 35 times smaller than Valgrind’s, respectively. Finally, our results with Valgrind are
consistent with the numbers (12-48 times slowdown) reported in a previous study [NS03].
If we consider all the applications, we see that iWatcher’s overhead ranges from 0.1% to 179%.
This overhead comes from three effects. The first one is the contention of monitoring-function
microthreads and the main program for processor resources (such as functional units or fetch band-
width) and cache space. Such contention has a high impact when there are more microthreads that
want to execute concurrently than hardware contexts in the SMT processor. In this case, the main-
program microthread cannot run all the time. Instead, monitoring-function and main-program
microthreads share the hardware contexts on a time-sharing basis.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5 show the fraction of time that there is more than one microthread
running or more than four microthreads ready to run, respectively. These figures include the main-
program microthread. These figures are closely related to the product of the number of triggering
accesses per 1 million instructions (Column 4) times the average size of the monitoring function
(Column 7). The larger the product, the bigger these figures. Note that having more than four
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Application % Time with # Triggering # iWatcher- Size of Size of Max Monitored Total Monitored Max # of Moni-
Microthreads Accesses per On/Off() iWatcherOn/- Monitoring Memory Size at Memory Size tored Objects
> 1 > 4 1M Instr. per 1M Instr. Off() (Cycles) Func. (Cycles) a Time (Bytes) (Bytes) at a Time
gzip-STACK 0.1 0.0 0.2 8988.1 20.6 22.4 40 19558568 10
gzip-FREE 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 1291.3 24.4 246880 246880 239
gzip-BO1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.9 210.4 177.0 80 1944 20
gzip-ML 23.1 16.9 13008.9 0.4 582.6 47.4 6613600 6847616 111
gzip-COMBO 26.2 15.2 13009.6 0.4 1082.3 45.2 6847616 6847616 243
gzip-BO2 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.6 59.0 24.8 32 3520 8
gzip-IV1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.2 40.5 21.7 4 528 1
gzip-IV2 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 83.0 23.0 4 4 1
cachelib 0.4 0.0 91.6 0.2 128.9 16.5 40 40 10
bc-1.06 0.1 0.0 4.8 2594.0 412.7 412.0 3272 4336 818
ncompress-4.2.4 1.1 1.0 321.7 160.8 162.5 151.5 4 8 1
gzip-1.2.4 0.9 0.9 371.4 4827.8 280.7 429.0 208 208 52
polymorph-0.4.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.3 204.0 127.6 8 20 2
tar-1.13.25 0.1 0.0 0.6 15.4 363.4 174.0 96 96 24
Table 3.5: Characterizing iWatcher execution.
microthreads running does not mean that the main-program microthread starves: the scheduler will
attempt to share all the contexts among all microthreads fairly. From the table, we see that three
applications use more than 1 microthread for more than 1% of the time. Of those, there are two
that have more than 4 microthreads ready to run for a significant fraction of the time. Specifically,
this fraction is 15.2% for gzip-COMBO and 16.9% for gzip-ML. Note that these applications have
relatively high iWatcher overhead in Table 3.4.
A second source of overhead is the iWatcherOn/Off() calls. These calls consume processor
cycles and, in addition, bring memory lines into L2, possibly polluting the cache. The overhead
caused by iWatcherOn/Off() cannot be hidden by TLS. In practice, their effect is small due to the
small number of calls, except in gzip-STACK, bc-1.06 and gzip-1.2.4. Indeed, Columns 5 and 6
of Table 3.5 show the number of iWatcherOn/Off() calls per 1 million instructions and the average
size of an individual call. Except for gzip-STACK, bc-1.06 and gzip-1.2.4, the product of number
of calls per 1M instructions times the size per call is tiny compared to the execution cycles taken
by 1 million instructions. For these cases, it can be shown that, even if every line brought into L2
by iWatcherOn/Off() calls causes one additional miss, the overall effect on program execution time
is very small.
For gzip-STACK, bc-1.06 and gzip-1.2.4, the number of iWatcherOn/Off() calls per 1M in-
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structions is huge (8988, 2594 and 4828, respectively). These calls introduce a large overhead
that cannot be hidden by TLS. Moreover, iWatcherOn/Off() calls partially cripple some conven-
tional compiler optimizations such as register allocation. The result is worse code and additional
overhead. Overall, while for most applications the iWatcherOn/Off() calls introduce negligible
overhead, for gzip-STACK, bc-1.06 and gzip-1.2.4, they are responsible for most of the 80%,
179% and 168% overheads of iWatcher, respectively.
For the applications with STACK check (gzip-STACK, ncompress-4.2.4, and polymorph-0.4.0),
the dominant overhead is the iWatcherOn/Off() calls. Since iWatcherOn() is called before en-
tering any functions and iWatcherOff() is called before returning from any functions, the fre-
quency of iWatcherOn/Off() calls is correlated to the function call frequency. Therefore, so is the
iWatcher overhead for STACK check. For example, since gzip-STACK has much more frequent
iWatcherOn/Off() calls than ncompress-4.2.4 and polymorph-0.4.0, it has much higher overhead.
Finally, there is a third, less important source of overhead in iWatcher, namely the spawning
of monitoring-function microthreads. As indicated in Section 3.6, each spawn takes 5 cycles.
Column 4 of Table 3.5 shows the number of triggering accesses per million instructions. Each of
these accesses spawns a microthread. From the table, we see that this parameter varies a lot across
applications. For most of these applications, the triggering frequency is very small. Moreover,
for all applications, even if we had a higher spawn overhead, such as 10 or 20 cycles, the total
overhead is still insignificant.
Overall, we conclude that the overhead of iWatcher can be high (37-179%) if the applica-
tion needs to execute more concurrent microthreads than contexts provided by the SMT processor
(gzip-ML and gzip-COMBO), or the application calls iWatcherOn/Off() very frequently (gzip-
STACK, bc-1.06, and gzip-1.2.4). For the other applications analyzed, the overhead is small,
ranging from 0.1% to 10.5%.
Finally, the last three columns of Table 3.5 show other parameters of iWatcher execution: av-
erage monitoring function size, maximum monitored memory size at a time, and total monitored
memory size, respectively. We can see that 6 monitoring functions take less than 25 cycles, and
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there are 8 applications where monitoring functions take 45-429 cycles. In some cases such as
gzip-ML and gzip-COMBO, these relatively expensive monitoring functions occur in applications
with frequent triggering accesses. When this happens, the fraction of time with more than 4 mi-
crothreads is high, which results in high iWatcher overhead (Table 3.4).
The last two columns show that in some applications such as gzip-ML and gzip-COMBO,
iWatcher needs to monitor many addresses. In this case, the Check Table will typically contain
many entries. Note, however, that even in this case, the size of the monitoring function, which
includes the Check Table lookup, is still modest. This is because our Check Table lookup algorithm
is efficient for most applications evaluated in our experiments.
3.7.2 Benefits of TLS
As indicated in Section 3.6, our experiments are performed using ReportMode. In this reaction
mode, TLS speeds-up execution by running monitoring-function microthreads in parallel with
each other and with the main program. To evaluate the effect of not having TLS, we now repeat
the experiments executing both monitoring-function and main-program code sequentially, instead
of spawning microthreads to execute them in parallel.
Figure 3.4 compares the execution overheads of iWatcher and iWatcher without TLS for all the
applications. The amount of monitoring overhead that can be hidden by TLS in a program is the
product of Columns 4 and 7 in Table 3.5. For programs with substantial monitoring, TLS reduces
the overheads. For example, in gzip-COMBO, the overhead of iWatcher without TLS is 61.4%,
while it is only 42.7% with TLS. This is a 30% reduction. As monitoring functions perform more
sophisticated tasks such as DIDUCE’s invariant inference [HL02], the benefits of TLS will become
more pronounced.
For programs with little monitoring, the product of Columns 4 and 7 in Table 3.5 is small. For
these applications, TLS does not provide benefit, because there is not much overhead that can be
hidden by TLS.
Overall, we recommend supporting TLS, as it reduces the overhead of iWatcher in some ap-
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Figure 3.4: Comparing iWatcher and iWatcher without TLS.
plications. We also note that TLS can be instrumental in efficiently supporting RollbackMode
(Section 3.3.5).
3.7.3 Sensitivity Study
To measure the sensitivity of iWatcher’s overhead, we artificially vary the fraction of triggering
accesses and the size of the monitoring functions. We perform the experiments on the bug-free
gzip and parser applications.
In a first experiment, we trigger a monitoring function every N th dynamic load in the program1,
where N varies from 2 to 10. The function walks an array, reading each value and comparing
it to a constant for a total of 40 instructions. The resulting execution overheads for iWatcher
(with the default 4-context SMT processor), and iWatcher without TLS are shown in Figure 3.5
(bar iWatcher-TLS4 and iWatcher-NoTLS, respectively). The figure shows that the overhead of
iWatcher with TLS with frequent triggering accesses is tolerable. Specifically, the gzip overhead
is 72% for 1 trigger out of 5 dynamic loads, and 194% for 1 trigger out of 2 loads. The parser
overheads are a bit higher, namely 182% for 1 trigger out of 5 loads, and 409% for 1 trigger out
of 2 loads. If iWatcher does not support TLS, however, the overheads go up: 273% for gzip and
593% for parser for 1 trigger out of 2 loads.
1For parser, we skip the program’s initialization phase, which lasts about 280 million instructions, because its
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Figure 3.5: Varying the fraction of triggering loads.
In a second experiment, we vary the size of the monitoring function. We use the same function
as before, except that we vary the number of instructions executed from 4 to 800. The function is
triggered in 1 out of 10 dynamic loads. The resulting execution overheads are shown in Figure 3.6
(iWatcher-TLS4 and iWatcher-NoTLS). The figure again shows that iWatcher overheads with TLS
are modest. For 200-instruction monitoring functions, the overhead is 65% for gzip and 169%
for parser. In iWatcher without TLS, the overhead is 173% for gzip and 356% for parser. As we
increase the monitoring function size, the absolute benefits of TLS increase, as TLS can hide more
monitoring overhead.
3.7.4 Scalability Analysis
To evaluate the effect of architectural resources on iWatcher’s overhead, we use different numbers
(2, 4, 6 and 8) of microthread contexts for the two experiments performed in the sensitivity study
(Section 3.7.3). Note that, in these experiments, the SMT processors with different numbers of
behavior is not representative of steady state.
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Figure 3.6: Varying the size of the monitoring function.
contexts have the same number of shared resources.
The first experiment varies the fraction of triggering accesses, as we did in the first experiment
of Section 3.7.3. The second to fifth bars in Figure 3.5 show that the execution overheads for
iWatcher with TLS on a 2/4/6/8-context SMT processor, respectively. The results show that using
a 4-context SMT reduces iWatcher’s overhead more than using a 2-context SMT. However, using
a 6 or 8-context SMT shows little improvement over using a 4-context SMT. More specifically,
when using a 4-context SMT instead of a 2-context SMT, the gzip overhead decreases by 17.3%
for 1 trigger out of 5 dynamic loads, and by 11.4% for 1 trigger out of 2 loads. For parser, the
overhead reduction using a 4-context SMT rather than a 2-context SMT is 18.6% for 1 trigger out
of 5 loads, and 14.2% for 1 trigger out of 2 loads. However, the overheads with a 6 or 8-context
SMT are almost the same as the overheads with a 4-context SMT in all triggering fractions for
both gzip and parser.
The second experiment varies the size of the monitoring function, as the second experiment in
Section 3.7.3. The resulting execution overheads are shown in Figure 3.6, from the second to the
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fifth bars. The results again show that a 4-context SMT is enough to reduce the overheads to the
minimum for almost all cases. There is no need to use more than 4 contexts for this experiment.
For example, in the 200-instruction monitoring function case, the overhead reduction as we get
from two to four contexts is 35.5% for gzip and 23.8% for parser. However, the overheads are
pretty much the same from 4 contexts to 6 or 8 contexts.
3.8 Summary
This chapter has presented iWatcher, a novel architectural scheme for minimal-overhead location-
controlled monitoring. iWatcher detects all accesses to a watched memory location, including
those by aliased pointer dereferences. To reduce overhead, iWatcher optionally leverages Thread-
Level Speculation (TLS). We have evaluated iWatcher on applications with various bugs. iWatcher
detects all bugs evaluated in our experiments with only a 0.1-179% execution overhead. In con-
trast, a well-known open-source bug detector called Valgrind induces orders of magnitude more
overhead, and can only detect a subset of the bugs. Moreover, even with 20% of the dynamic
loads monitored in a program, iWatcher only adds 72-182% overhead. Finally, TLS is effective at
reducing overheads for programs with substantial monitoring, and a 4-context SMT is enough to
achieve the best performance in our experiments.
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Chapter 4
AccMon: Automatically Detecting
Memory-related Bugs
4.1 Overview
Many methods have been proposed to detect bugs dynamically during execution. These methods
can be classified into two categories: the programming-rule-based approach and the statistics-rule-
based approach. Methods in both categories check for violations of certain rules at run time, but
they focus on different types of rules. The programming-rule-based approach focuses on rules that
should be followed when programming in a specific language such as C/C++. “An array pointer
cannot move out-of-bounds” is an example of these rules. Much work has been conducted on this
approach, including Purify [HJ92], CCured [CHM+03, NMW02], SafeC [ABS94] and Jones and
Kelly’s tool [JK97].
The statistics-rule-based approach is a newly explored direction that extracts rules (e.g., invari-
ants) statistically from multiple successful executions (e.g., in-house regression tests) or multiple
periods of a single long-running execution, and then uses these rules to check for violations in a
later execution (or later in the same long-running execution). This approach is promising because
it can catch bugs that may not violate any programming rules. Many statistics-based rules such as
value-based invariants (i.e., a variable’s value always falls in a certain range during normal runs)
are related to applications semantics. Such information is difficult to infer from the code, and is
too tedious to be documented or annotated by programmers.
Only a few studies have been conducted on the statistics-rule-based approach, and almost all
are software-only solutions. Liblit et al [LAZJ03] uses statistical analysis to find the difference
between abnormal and normal runs for the purpose of providing more information for postmortem
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bug analysis. DAIKON [ECGN99, ECGN00] and DIDUCE [HL02] focus on detecting bugs on the
fly by automatically extracting invariants and detecting violations during execution. Both DAIKON
and DIDUCE consider only value-based invariants, and therefore can miss bugs that do not violate
these invariants.
Novel architectural support would provide several benefits for bug detection over software-only
solutions: (1) Efficiency: Architectural support can significantly lower the overhead of dynamic
monitoring because it does not need extensive code instrumentation. Note also that such instru-
mentation can interfere with compiler optimizations. Moreover, it is possible to use extra hardware
to speed up certain operations. Both iWatcher and AccMon are examples that demonstrate this
benefit. (2) Accuracy: Architectural support can avoid pointer aliasing problems and accurately
capture all desired accesses to monitored memory objects. (3) Generality: Architectural support
can be language-independent, cross-module and easy to use with low-level system code such as
the operating system. Moreover, it can be designed to work directly with binary code without
recompilation.
This chapter proposes two innovative ideas in architectural support for software bug detection.
First, we find many memory-related bugs, such as stack smashing, buffer overflow, memory cor-
ruption and some semantic bugs (e.g., wrong pointer assignment), share a common symptom that a
key variable is accessed by an “illegal” instruction which usually do not access this variable in bug-
free runs. We call such “illegal” instruction an outlier instruction. Based on this phenomena, we
propose a new statistics-based method, called program counter (PC)-based invariance, to detect
memory-related bugs on the fly. We also observe that in most programs, a given variable is typi-
cally accessed by only a few instructions, which can be used to identify the outlier instructions. We
validate this observation using statistical analysis with nine applications (See Section 4.2). Based
on this observation, if we can capture the invariant of the set of PCs that normally access a given
key variable, it is possible to detect accesses by outlier instructions, and thus detect bugs. This is
regardless of the values that these instructions assign to the variables.
Second, we propose a simple architectural extension, called the Check Look-aside Buffer (CLB),
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that uses a Bloom filter [Blo70] to reduce the monitoring overhead in iWatcher. This extension
takes advantage of the good temporal locality that exists in object accesses to filter out a large
percentage of monitored accesses. This extension reduces the overhead by up to 80.6% in our
experiments.
Based on the above two ideas, we have built an automatic, low-overhead, low-false-alarm, PC-
based invariant detection tool called AccMon (Access Monitor, pronounced as “A-k-Mon”) that
uses a combination of architectural, run-time system, and compiler support to catch hard-to-find
memory-related bugs. First, AccMon leverages the iWatcher framework with the CLB extension
to monitor accesses to key variables. Second, the run-time system automatically infers PC-based
invariants and detects violations of these invariants. Third, AccMon uses compiler support to
provide certain optimizations to reduce the amount of monitoring and prune false alarms. We also
use the binary instrumentation tool PIN [LCM+05] to build a pure software implementation of
PC-based invariant detection tool called AccMon-S.
Our experimental results with nine buggy applications (with a total of twelve bugs) show that
AccMon and AccMon-S can detect all ten bugs in the seven non-server applications with few false
alarms (0 for five applications and 2-8 for two applications), whereas several tested existing tools
fail to detect some bugs. In particular, AccMon and AccMon-S catches a bug in the bc application
that has never been reported. Moreover, AccMon-S also detects the two bugs in the two server
programs, apache and squid, with 0-4 false alarms (AccMon cannot run these servers due to the
limitation of our simulator infrastructure). AccMon also has low overhead (0.24-2.88 times), which
is an order of magnitude lower than Purify [HJ92]. Our results also show that the CLB architectural
extension and other optimizations significantly reduce overheads.
AccMon complements other existing memory-bug detection tools, including programming-
rule-based approaches and statistics-rule-based approaches. This is because AccMon provides
several unique advantages, some or all of which are unavailable in other tools:
• Since AccMon is a statistics-based approach, it does not need pointer-type/object informa-
tion. Therefore, it can detect bugs that either do not have such information (e.g., because of
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fine-grained pointer manipulation through various type-casting), or do not violate pointer-
type/object association (such as a wrong pointer assignment bug caused by copy-paste).
Our experiments identify two such bugs that are detected by AccMon but are missed by
programming-rule-based tools such as Purify [HJ92] and CCured [CHM+03, NMW02].
• Since AccMon uses architectural support to detect accesses to monitored memory objects,
it can detect memory corruption that occurs in third-party libraries whose source code is
unavailable. We have found one such bug in our experiments that is detected by AccMon
but missed by the other tested tools.
• AccMon does not rely on variable values, and therefore can detect bugs that do not violate
value-based invariants. In our experiments, AccMon detects six bugs that are very difficult
to catch using value-based invariant detection tools such as DAIKON [ECGN99, ECGN00]
and DIDUCE [HL02].
• Since AccMon relies on architectural support, it is language-independent and easy to use for
low-level system code, e.g., operating system code. In our experiments, AccMon is able to
catch an extracted version of a real bug that exists in the latest version of Linux.
• Although the current AccMon implementation uses source code in order to exploit certain
compiler-based optimizations, it can directly use binary code without recompilation.
• AccMon’s overhead is low. Moreover, AccMon uses the iWatcher framework that can dy-
namically turn on/off monitoring with little overhead, completely eliminating the overhead
in unmonitored code. Therefore, AccMon can be used on production runs.
This remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the rationale
for PC-based invariants. Section 4.3 presents the main idea and the details of our AccMon tool.
Experimental methodology and results are presented in Section 4.5 and 4.6, respectively, followed
by the summary in Section 4.7.
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4.2 PC-Based Invariants
When observing the behavior of programs, we found an interesting characteristic: program loca-
tion and data accessed are highly correlated. This characteristic has two aspects. First, for most
memory objects, only a few instructions access a given object. Second, in short-running programs,
for runs with different inputs, the sets of instructions that access a given object are remarkably
similar; in long-running programs, the set of instructions that access a given object is relatively
stable across different execution periods (of duration long enough to capture at least one cycle of
most computation phases). The latter is especially the case for long-running server programs.
Intuitively, this characteristic makes sense. In most programs, a memory object is accessed at
only a few places. For example, a linked list is usually accessed by the list manipulation functions.
Also, from the programmers’ point of view, it is very difficult to write or understand a program
where a memory object can be accessed in many places. For convenience, we refer to the set of
instructions that normally access a given memory object as its AccSet.
Based on this observation, this chapter proposes a new type of invariant, the Program Counter-
based (PC-based) invariant. Generally speaking, a PC-based invariant captures the relationship
between a memory object and its AccSet. Based on this relationship, it is possible to detect “illegal”
accesses by an outlier instruction (an instruction that is not in the AccSet of the accessed memory
object) due to buffer overflow, stack smashing, dangling pointers, memory corruption or other
memory-related bugs.
To validate this observation and understand the characteristics of AccSets, we have analyzed
the behavior of twelve programs (six real applications used in our evaluation of AccMon and six
SPEC2000 benchmarks). In particular, we examine the average size and stability of AccSets. If the
average AccSet size is large, it will be hard to detect bugs because the confidence of identifying an
outlier instruction will be low. Similarly, if most AccSets are not stable across different inputs or
different execution periods, they cannot be used to detect bugs because they may introduce many
false alarms.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative distribution of global objects’ AccSet size for six SPEC2000 benchmarks
and six real applications. Each cumulative distribution curve gives the percentage of global data
objects whose AccSet sizes are smaller than or equal to a given size. A high percentage for a small
size means that most objects have small AccSets sizes. Note that the SPEC-gzip and gzip-1.2.4
applications are different.
To find the average size and stability of AccSets, we collect the AccSets for all global and
heap objects (global and heap variables) in the twelve programs, using multiple runs with different
inputs. We then examine the cumulative distribution of the AccSet sizes and measure the similarity
of AccSets across 5 runs with different inputs.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the cumulative distributions of the global objects’ AccSet sizes
and the global and heap objects’ AccSet sizes, respectively, for the six SPEC2000 benchmarks
and six real applications. Considering only global objects, for the six SPEC2000 benchmarks,
90%-96% of the global objects in vpr, parser and twolf have AccSet sizes less than 5, and 80%-
85% of the global objects in mcf, gzip and bzip2 have AccSet sizes less than 15. For the six real
applications, around 85-100% of the global objects have AccSet sizes less than 10. Looking at
both global and heap objects together, for the six SPEC2000 benchmarks, 85%-90% of the global
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative distribution of global and heap objects’ AccSet size for six SPEC2000
benchmarks and six real applications. Each cumulative distribution curve gives the percentage of
global and heap data objects whose AccSet sizes are smaller than or equal to a given size. are
different.
and heap objects in vpr, parser and twolf have AccSet sizes less than 15, and 80%-85% of the
global and heap objects in gzip and bzip2 have AccSet sizes less than 15. The AccSet sizes for
are larger, but still 67% of the global and heap objects have AccSet sizes less than 11. For the six
real applications, around 85-100% of the global and heap objects have AccSet sizes less than 10.
In other words, in general the average AccSet size is small, and therefore AccSets can be used to
detect outlier accesses with reasonable confidence.
To measure the stability of AccSets across multiple runs with different inputs, we introduce
a metric called Similarity. For a given data object OBJ and n runs, the similarity for this object
across the n runs is defined as
Similarity(OBJ) =
| ∩ (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)|
| ∪ (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)|
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution of global objects’ AccSet similarity across 5 runs for six
SPEC2000 benchmarks and six real applications. Each cumulative distribution curve shows the
percentage of global data objects whose AccSets have a similarity greater than or equal to a given
value. A high percentage at a value close to 1 indicates that most global objects’ AccSets are
similar across different runs. Note that the x-axis starts at 1 and goes to 0.
where Si is the AccSet of OBJ in run i. The similarity of an object is the size of the intersection
of its AccSets across different runs divided by the size of the union of its AccSets in all the runs.
It measures the fraction of common instructions in the total possible instructions that access this
object. If the AccSet for an object is very stable, the similarity metric is close to one. If it is very
unstable, the similarity metric is close to zero.
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the cumulative distributions of the global objects’ AccSet sim-
ilarity and the global and heap objects’ AccSet similarity for different runs. The figures show that
in general most objects have a similarity close to one, which indicates that most AccSets are stable
across different runs. For the six SPEC2000 benchmarks, 93-100% of the global objects’ AccSets
in five of them (except bzip2) have similarity values greater than 0.96. In bzip2, 79% of the global
objects’ AccSets have have similarity values greater than 0.9. 85-96% of the global and heap ob-
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative distribution of global and heap objects’ AccSet similarity across 5 runs for
six SPEC2000 benchmarks and six real applications. Each cumulative distribution curve shows the
percentage of global and heap data objects whose AccSets have a similarity greater than or equal
to a given value.
jects’ AccSet in gzip, parser, mcf and twolf have similarity values greater than 0.91, and 83% and
75% of the global and heap objects’ AccSet in vpr and bzip2 have similarity values greater than
0.91, respectively. For the six real applications, as shown in Figures 4.3(c) and 4.3(d), around
84-100% of the global objects’ AccSets have similarity values greater than 0.97. In Figures 4.4(c)
and 4.4(d), 84-100% of the global and heap objects’ AccSet have similarity values greater than
0.97 in gzip, tar and polymorph, and 70-88% of the global and heap objects’ AccSet have similar-
ity values greater than 0.7 in ncompress, man and bc. These results show that AccSets are quite
stable across multiple runs with different inputs.
Further validation of our observations on PC-based invariants is provided by the data in Sec-
tion 4.6.
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4.3 Design of AccMon
Based on the above observation, a violation of a PC-based invariant usually indicates a potential
bug in the program. For example, if a memory location is accessed by an instruction which has
never accessed this location during normal execution, it is likely that this access is “illegal”, re-
sulting from a memory-related bug. In this section, we design a tool to automatically detect these
cases. We call this tool AccMon.
4.3.1 Overview
AccMon uses some architectural support as well as some compiler and run-time software infras-
tructure. The main functionality of each of the components of AccMon is shown in Table 4.1.
AccMon uses iWatcher to catch all memory accesses to monitored memory objects and trigger
a monitoring function at such accesses [ZQL+04]. The monitoring function will check if the PC
used to access the object is in the object’s AccSet. If the TLS option of iWatcher is enabled, the
main program is speculatively executed in parallel while the monitoring function runs, to reduce
overhead.
Component Main Functionality
Architecture iWatcher Catch accesses to monitored objects, invoke monitor-
ing functions to check if a PC belongs to the AccSet
of an object, and execute the main program in parallel
with monitoring functions
CLB Filter most accesses that do not violate PC-based in-
variants
Compiler Insert iWatcherOn/Off to monitor key memory ob-
jects, and provide hints to reduce overheads and false
alarms
Run-time system Extract invariants, detect violations and rank errors
Table 4.1: Functionality of the components of AccMon.
To further reduce monitoring overhead, we propose the Check Look-aside Buffer (CLB). The
CLB is a hardware cache that, for most recently-accessed monitored objects, filters out the accesses
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that do not violate the PC-based invariant. To do that, the CLB keeps the AccSets for several
recently-accessed monitored objects. The memory address and PC of each load and store are
checked against the contents of the CLB. If the memory address is found and the PC is part of the
AccSet of the address, the monitoring function is not executed. If, instead, the memory address
is found but the PC is not part of its AccSet, an access that violates the PC-based invariant has
been found. Finally, if the memory address is not found in the CLB and iWatcher indicates that
this access is to a monitored object (i.e., a triggering access), the monitoring function is executed
to check if the access violates the PC-based invariant. In addition, the run-time system inserts this
address and its AccSet into the CLB. If necessary, the AccSet of a memory object in the CLB can
be dynamically augmented with a new PC (See Section 4.3.2 for details).
The CLB resides in the processor. Figure 4.5 shows how it interacts with the different pipeline
stages and the iWatcher trigger bit. More details are given in Section 4.3.2.
iW
atcher’s
Trigger Bit
Fetch ScheduleDecode/Rename Commit
Execute
AddrGen Cache/Memory Access
CLB
Addr
PC
trigger monitoring function?
Figure 4.5: Interaction of the CLB with the processor pipeline and the iWatcher trigger bit.
We modify the Cetus compiler [LJE03] to select memory objects to be monitored and to pro-
vide hints to reduce the number of false alarms and the run-time overhead. In our current imple-
mentation, we monitor global data objects, heap objects, and a few key stack objects, such as the
stack locations that store return addresses. The compiler uses iWatcherOn to request iWatcher to
monitor an object, and iWatcherOff to stop doing it. While the monitoring is on, iWatcher will
automatically catch accesses to monitored objects.
The compiler also provides hints to reduce overheads and false alarms. For example, the com-
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piler passes information to the run-time system regarding what instructions use pointers or access
arrays. These instructions are more likely to induce bugs if their PCs are detected as outliers.
The compiler can also temporarily disable system-wide monitoring using DisableMonitoring()
in certain functions that do not have pointers or array accesses.
Note that although our current implementation uses a compiler to insert iWatcherOn/Off() into
the source code, AccMon can also leverage a binary-instrumentation tool to avoid recompilation if
source code is unavailable. However, source level instrumentation can provide some advantages,
such as the optimizations described above and in Section 4.3.4. Since most debugging is done in-
house, recompilation may not be a major issue. In addition, since monitoring can be dynamically
turned off for most production runs by the underlying iWatcher architecture, code can be shipped
with iWatcherOn/Off instrumentation.
The run-time system executes the monitoring function that detects and checks invariants. There
are two distinct phases: the training phase and the bug-detection phase. During the training phase,
the monitoring function dynamically builds AccSets for the monitored objects. In addition, it also
tracks the number of occurrences of each PC in an AccSet. This information will be used later,
in the bug-detection phase, to determine the confidence level for an outlier PC. During the bug-
detection phase, the monitoring function checks each triggering access that does not hit in the CLB,
to see if it is an outlier. In addition, the monitoring function dynamically adjusts the confidence
level as execution progresses. Section 4.3.3 describes the basic algorithms in more detail.
At the end of the bug-detection phase, AccMon produces an error report with a ranked list of
detected violations. The violations are sorted by their confidence levels as computed by AccMon.
Programmers can go through the list to check for potential bugs. Programmers can also mark
certain errors as false alarms, and add the newly-observed PCs that cause false alarms into AccSets,
so that AccMon can learn from its mistakes to reduce the number of false alarms in future runs.
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4.3.2 CLB with a Bloom Filter
The main purpose of the CLB is to reduce overheads by filtering most of the valid accesses to
monitored objects. Such valid accesses do not need to trigger the monitoring function. By filtering
most of the valid accesses, AccMon can significantly reduce the number of times the monitoring
function is executed. Since the overhead for the bug-detection phase is more important than the
overhead for the training phase, the CLB is only used for the bug-detection phase in our current
prototype of AccMon.
Designing the CLB is challenging. A major constraint is that the CLB needs to be very fast.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.5, the CLB is tightly coupled with the processor pipeline. Moreover, it
is accessed by every load and store instruction. In a wide-issue processor, the CLB is accessed very
often and has little time to make a decision. Consequently, it cannot be built as a large associative
table.
In addition, the CLB ideally needs to keep a lot of information. Since AccMon monitors every
global data object, heap object and stack return address, there can be many monitored objects. For
example, we have up to 10,000 such objects in our experiments. Suppose that, on average, each
AccSet contains 10 PCs, where each PC is 4 bytes. In this case, an AccSet requires at least 48 bytes,
since it needs 8 bytes to record the memory object’s start and end address. Therefore, maintaining
all AccSets would require a 480,000-byte CLB. Such information would need to be organized in a
two-level manner: A memory address would first index the table and find the matching CLB entry;
then, the PC would be used to index the AccSet of the address to find if the PC was there.
Clearly, keeping all this information in a fast CLB is impractical. Moreover, it is unclear how
to handle AccSets that contain more than 10 PCs.
To address these challenges, AccMon uses two strategies to make the CLB hardware practical:
the first one is to use a Bloom filter to avoid storing all the PCs of an AccSet in each entry; the
second one is to treat the CLB as a cache, which maintains only the AccSets of recently-accessed
monitored objects.
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We use a Bloom filter for the CLB because it can quickly test whether a PC belongs to the
AccSet of the accessed object, and it uses only a few bytes to maintain a relatively large set. The
Bloom filter was first proposed by Bloom [Blo70] to support fast membership testing of a set. It
uses multiple hash functions to map an element into a bit vector. For each member element, its
corresponding bits in the vector are set to 1. To test whether an element is a member or not, its
corresponding bits based on the hash functions are tested. If one of the bits is 0, the element does
not belong to the set. Otherwise, the element may belong to the set. A Bloom filter never has false
negatives, but it may introduce false positives due to hash collisions. However, if the vector is long
enough and enough bits are used for hashing, the probability of false positives is very low.
Figure 4.6 shows the implementation of the CLB. Similar to a TLB, the CLB is a fully-
associative table with only a few entries (4 or 8 in our experiments). At each memory instruc-
tion, the memory address is used to index the CLB. Each CLB entry has 24 bytes, storing the
start address, end address and the Bloom filter vector for a recently-accessed monitored memory
object. The CLB uses 128 bits as the Bloom filter vector. At each memory instruction, 20 bits
(bit 2 to bit 21, starting from the least significant bit) are taken from this instruction’s PC. The 20
bits are broken into 4 parts, with 5 bits each. Each part is used to directly index 32 bits in the
Bloom filter vector of the corresponding CLB entry. This partial address indexing idea was also
used in [PLL02]. We use a direct index instead of a hash function to simplify the logic as much as
possible.
If all indexed bits in the four parts have value 1, we conclude that this PC is in the AccSet.
Therefore, this access is assumed to be valid and can be filtered even if it is recorded as a triggering
access by iWatcher (Figure 4.5). Since we directly index bits 2-21 of a PC to four bits in the Bloom
filter vector, the collision rate is almost zero, and so is the rate of false positives introduced by the
CLB. A false positive occurs when an outlier PC is incorrectly flagged as part of the AccSet.
Treating the CLB as a cache exploits the good temporal locality of object accesses. Most
programs have well-clustered memory accesses: an object such as an array or a structure tends to
be accessed many times in a short period of time. If we keep recently accessed monitored objects
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Figure 4.6: Implementation of the CLB using a Bloom filter.
in the CLB (with one entry per object), we only need a small table with a few entries to filter most
valid accesses to monitored objects. As shown later in Table 4.8 in Section 4.6.2, the CLB hit ratios
for most of the evaluated applications are very high, namely 80.1%-99.9% and 83.8%-99.9% for a
4-entry and an 8-entry CLB, respectively.
The CLB uses the least recently used (LRU) algorithm for replacement. After the CLB misses a
triggering access, the AccMon run-time system inserts the accessed object’s AccSet into the CLB.
If the CLB is full, the LRU entry in the CLB is replaced. This is controlled by the run-time system
because CLB misses are handled by the AccMon monitoring function in the run-time system.
4.3.3 Basic Algorithms
The basic training and bug-detection algorithms, implemented mainly in AccMon’s run-time sys-
tem, have three parts: (1) extracting invariants, (2) checking for violations of invariants, and (3)
ranking results. All three parts need to access a core software data structure called “PC-based in-
variants Table” (PCT), which maintains the AccSet for each monitored memory object. The PCT
is maintained as a hash table and can be searched using a memory object’s name, as described in
Section 4.3.4. Initially, the PCT is empty. Each PCT entry contains both an AccSet and an occur-
rence counter for each PC in the AccSet. This information is used to calculate confidence and rank
results, as described later.
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During the training phase with bug-free runs (or bug-free execution phases for long-running
programs), AccMon builds the AccSet for each monitored object. At an access to an object obj by
an instruction, AccMon first looks up obj in the PCT. If this obj is not in the PCT, it is inserted
in it. In any case, the instruction’s PC is added to the obj’s AccSet if that PC is not already a
member. The PC’s occurrence counter is also incremented. At the end of each training run, the
PCT is saved on disk and is reloaded to memory at the beginning of the next training run. Since
all triggering accesses made during the training phase need to go through the run-time system, the
CLB is disabled during the training phase.
During the bug-detection phase, AccMon detects violations of PC-based invariants. In this
phase, the CLB is enabled. When an object obj is accessed by a PC, the CLB is checked for obj. If
the access is not filtered by the CLB (either because the CLB misses this obj or the corresponding
Bloom filter indicates that this PC is not in obj’s AccSet) and the access is a triggering one, the
AccMon monitoring function is triggered to determine if this is an outlier access. To do that,
AccMon first checks the PCT to see if the PC is already in obj’s AccSet. If it is, then obj and its
AccSet are inserted into the CLB. Otherwise, the AccMon monitoring function reports the access
as a suspect and stores it in a table (the Suspect Table). Subsequent accesses by the same PC to the
same object are not reported.
To reduce the programmers’ effort in analyzing the error report produced by AccMon, the
errors are ranked based on their confidence values. A programmer only needs to check the top
(e.g. 10) reported errors to find bugs. For an outlier access to object obj, its confidence value
should depend on the number of observed accesses to obj, and obj’s AccSet size. If obj has been
accessed only a few times, an outlier access to obj is less likely to be a bug. Instead, it is more
likely to be a false alarm caused by insufficient training. Similarly, if obj’s AccSet is large, the
possibility for this outlier to be a bug is also relatively low. Similar intuition is also shared by
other work [ECC01, HL02].
Moreover, we also consider the historical behavior of the outlier instruction. If the instruction
has been previously identified as an outlier for other memory objects, it is more likely to be a bug
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because this instruction may have corrupted many other objects.
Combining all these factors, the confidence value of an error is computed by using the formula:
Confidence =
NumAccesstotal × (NumOccurrencepc + 1)
AccSetSize + 1
where NumAccesstotal is the total number of times obj has been accessed, NumOccurrencepc
is the number of times this outlier PC has been identified as an outlier for other objects as well,
and AccSetSize is obj’s AccSet size. While it is possible to further refine our ranking function, our
results show that this ranking function is already very good.
4.3.4 Design Issues
Monitoring and Naming Objects
AccMon currently monitors all global data objects, all heap objects and key stack objects, e.g. stack
locations used to store return addresses. To monitor heap objects, we intercept all memory alloca-
tion functions and insert instructions to call iWatcherOn immediately after a memory-allocation,
and iWatcherOff immediately before a memory-free. For realloc(), iWatcherOff is called before it
and iWatcherOn after it. Note that, the monitoring scheme for heap objects is language and run-
time dependent. Our scheme assumes that heap objects are explicitly allocated and freed and they
are not moved during their lifetime. A different scheme is required for languages with garbage
collection.
We must name each memory object in the PCT. The primary constraint on the naming strategy
is that the name of an object cannot change across different runs. For global data objects, their
virtual memory addresses are used as their names. A global object’s address is decided at compile
time and will not change across different runs.
However, this simple naming strategy does not work for heap and stack objects because their
virtual addresses can change across different runs. Instead, we use a call-chain naming strategy,
which has been used in some previous work [BZ93, CCJA98, LW94] for other purposes. When
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a heap object is allocated, it is named based on the current call-chain, i.e., the XOR-folding of
the call-site address chain. As suggested in the literature [BZ93, CCJA98, LW94], it is sufficient
to use the last four call-sites in the call chain to distinguish heap/stack objects from one another.
Although several heap objects may have the same call-chain, e.g. those allocated in a for loop,
it is not important for our case since those objects are naturally similar and usually have similar
AccSets.
Pruning False Alarms
It is possible that some corner cases caused by rarely touched paths end up being reported as
violations of an invariant. These are false alarms. Too many false alarms make a debugging tool
unusable.
To reduce false alarms, we use, in addition to confidence levels, simple heuristics. Specifically,
by analyzing the behavior of buggy code, we have found that most invalid accesses in C/C++
occur in pointer dereferences and array accesses. The invariant violations caused by pointer or
array accesses are more likely to be bugs, while violations caused by other accesses are more
likely to be corner cases caused by rarely executed paths.
Based on the above observation, we use the Cetus compiler [LJE03] to identify pointer-based
dereferences and array accesses. The Cetus compiler generates a list of PCs that may be pointer-
based dereferences or array accesses. Of course, the compiler has to be conservative, otherwise
AccMon may miss some bugs. During the bug-detection phase, the AccMon monitoring function
checks a suspect PC against this list. If the PC is not in the list, the suspect access is unlikely to
be a bug. This optimization may cause some bugs to escape detection, but the probability is low
based on our program behavior analysis.
Reducing Overhead
Overhead is another major issue for software debugging. We consider the two phases in which
AccMon is used: the invariant training phase and the bug-detection phase. Since the training phase
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typically takes place in-house using successful regression test runs before the software is released,
or when a long-running server program has very light load (e.g. when it receives few requests),
the overhead during this phase is less critical. In contrast, minimizing the overhead in the bug-
detection phase is very important because such overhead may prevent some time-related bugs
from occurring. In addition, it also affects the length of program execution that can be realistically
monitored.
There are two ways to reduce overheads in AccMon: reducing the number of accesses moni-
tored, and reducing the overhead of monitoring an access. The following three optimizations can
be used by AccMon to reduce overheads. The first two belong to the first type and the third one
belongs to the second type:
• Monitor only store accesses. Since corrupting writes are typically more harmful than illegal
reads, it may be enough to monitor only store instructions. This can be achieved by setting
the WatchF lag in the iWatcherOn call appropriately [ZQL+04]. It is possible that this
will lead to some bugs going undetected, but we feel that the probability is relatively low.
In any case, users can disable or enable this optimization based on their overhead tolerance
level.
• Disable monitoring in certain functions. If a function contains no pointer dereference or
array access, we can turn off the monitoring of memory accesses. This optimization is per-
formed using EnableMonitoring() and DisableMonitoring(). We have not implemented
this optimization in AccMon yet.
• Software optimization. Besides using the CLB to filter out most valid accesses to monitored
objects, AccMon software can also be optimized to reduce the overhead of the monitoring
function. For example, in our current implementation, we use a hash table to manage the
PCT.
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4.4 Software Implementation – AccMon-S
To demonstrate the efficiency of the hardware implementation, and to evaluate the PC-based in-
variant detection idea with real server applications (our simulation of AccMon described in Section
4.5 does not support running server programs), we also implemented the PC invariants purely in
software using the PIN binary instrumentation tool [LCM+05].
Like AccMon, the key task of AccMon-S is to collect and maintain PC invariants information,
and use this information for bug detection. Specifically, for all global variables, all heap variables,
and all stack locations storing the return addresses, AccMon-S learns the set of PCs accessing
these variables during normal executions (at training phase), and then uses the PC sets to check
for possible violations during the detection phase. The global variables are identified by using
the symbol table, the heap variables are identified by wrapping memory allocation calls, and the
stack return address locations are gotten using the PIN tool. In software, PC sets information is
collected by PIN at every access to the interested locations (all accesses will be checked if they
go to an interested location, and if yes, collect the PC), and maintained in the PCT table. This is
training. For detection, the PCT table will be checked for possible violations. Again, every access
will be intercepted, and if it goes to an interested location, checked for PC invariant violation.
4.5 Evaluation Methodology
4.5.1 Methodology Overview
We use cycle-accurate execution-driven simulations to model a workstation with iWatcher [ZQL+04]
and AccMon functionality. The parameters of the architecture are shown in Table 4.2. The ar-
chitecture includes a 4-context SMT processor with optional TLS support. The experiments for
software implementation AccMon-S are conducted on real machines with a 2.4GHz Pentium 4
processor, 512KB L2 cache, 1GB of memory, and a 100Mbps Ethernet connection. For server
applications, we run servers on one machine and clients on another.
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CPU frequency 2.4GHz CLB entries 4 or 8
Thread contexts 4 ROB size 360
Fetch width 16 Instruction window 160
Issue width 8 Int FUs 6
Retire width 12 Ld/St FUs 4
Ld/St queue entries 32/thr FP FUs 4
L1 cache 32K, 4-way, 32B/line, 3 cycles latency
L2 cache 1M, 8-way, 32B/line, 10 cycles latency
Main memory 200 cycles latency
Table 4.2: Architecture modeled.
We compare AccMon and AccMon-S to the Purify [HJ92] and CCured [CHM+03, NMW02]
(version 1.2.5) tools. Purify instruments the object code at link time and does not require source
code changes. It can detect several types of memory-related bugs, including uninitialized reads,
writing to freed memory and memory leaks. CCured is a hybrid static and dynamic bug detection
tool. It first attempts to enforce a strong type system in C programs via static analysis. The portions
of the program that cannot be guaranteed by the CCured type system are instrumented with run-
time checks to monitor the safety of the execution.
Because CCured requires significant manual changes to an application’s source code to con-
form to its standard, we have not run all applications with CCured. We modified six applications
to run with CCured. For application tar, apache and squid, we are unable to run it with CCured
despite great manual effort. Therefore, we estimate the behavior based on CCured’s functional-
ity, but we cannot predict the overhead. In contrast, AccMon and AccMon-S do not require any
manual modification of an application’s source code.
We run Purify and CCured on the same real machine as that used for AccMon-S. Since Ac-
cMon runs on a simulator, we cannot compare the absolute execution time of AccMon with that
of AccMon-S, Purify and CCured. Instead, we compare their execution overheads relative to runs
without any monitoring.
Since existing value-based invariant detection tools such as DIDUCE [HL02] do not work
with C/C++ programs, we cannot quantitatively compare AccMon and AccMon-S with DIDUCE.
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Instead, we carefully evaluated each application to see whether value-based invariants can easily
be used to catch the bugs. To be as fair as possible, we even used tricks (such as assuming perfect
pointer aliasing knowledge) beyond those envisioned in the papers [ECGN99, ECGN00, HL02]
describing these tools.
4.5.2 Evaluated Applications
We have conducted two sets of experiments. The first set uses buggy applications to evaluate the
functionality and overheads of AccMon and AccMon-S for software debugging. Note that, the two
real buggy server applications apache and squid are only used to evaluate AccMon-S, since our
simulator does not support running them so far. The second set further evaluates the overheads of
AccMon with bug-free SPEC benchmarks.
For the first set of experiments, we selected nine buggy programs that exhibit a broad spec-
trum of memory-related bugs. Table 4.3 gives the details about these applications and their bug
characteristics. Two of them are real server applications, namely apache and squid. Some of the
non-server applications, such as tar-1.13.25 and bc-1.06, are relatively large, with more than 17K
lines of code. Note that, we use the server applications to only evaluate AccMon-S, since our
AccMon simulator does not support server programs.
The eight real buggy programs are from the open-source community. The bugs come with
the code and were introduced by the original programmers (except the two injected bugs in bc-
1.06). For some programs, we select an older version that had memory-related bugs. The eight
programs are: gzip, man, polymorph, ncompress, tar, bc, apache and squid. gzip (GNU zip) is a
popular compression utility provided by the GNU project. man is a utility in the UNIX family to
format and display online manual pages. polymorph is a tool to convert Windows’ style file names
to something more portable for UNIX systems. ncompress is a compression and decompression
utility that is compatible with the original UNIX compress utility. tar is a tool to create and
manipulate tar archives. bc is an arbitrary precision numeric processing language. apache is a
commonly used web server. squid is a web cache and proxy server.
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Application Lines Bug Bug Location Corrupted Bug Description
of Code Type Location
ncompress 1922 Real- compress42.c: Stack Input file name longer than 1024
-4.2.4 Reported line 886 bytes corrupts stack return address
linux 256 Extracted based on Semantic Wrong pointer assignment
-simple memory.c:116 Bug caused by copy-paste
polymorph 716 Real- polymorph.c: Stack Input file name longer than 2048
-0.4.0 Reported lines 193&200 bytes corrupts stack return address
gzip-1.2.4 8163 Real- gzip.c: Data/BSS Input file name longer than 1024
Reported line 1009 bytes overflows a global variable
tar-1.13.25 27137 Real- prepargs.c: Heap Unexpected loop bounds
Reported line 92 causes heap object overflow
man-1.5h1 4675 Real- man.c: Data/BSS Wrong bounds checking
Reported line 998 causes static object corrupted
Real- storage.c: Heap Misuse of bound variable
Reported line 176 corrupts heap objects
Real- util.c: Heap Overwrite the heap object bounds
Unreported line 577
bc-1.06 17042 bc-lib: - Data/BSS Data corrupted inside a
Injected third-party library
bc-free: - Heap Access a freed object that
Injected may be allocated for other data
apache 283K Real- mod alias.c: Stack AliasMatch expression in config file with more
-1.3.27 Reported line 311 than 10 captures corrupts stack return address
squid 93K Real- ftp.c: Heap Mis-calculation of the request length due to
-2.3.s5 Reported lines 1024&1027 special chars causes heap object overflow
Table 4.3: Applications and bugs analyzed. “Real-Reported” means that the bug was introduced
by the original programmers and has been reported and fixed. “Real-Unreported” means that the
bug was introduced by the original programmers but has never been reported before. “Injected”
means that the bug was injected by us. “Extracted” means that the bug was extracted from a real
program.
To demonstrate the unique bug-detection strengths of PC invariants, we inject two bugs in bc-
1.06. The first, bc-lib, demonstrates the case where a memory object is corrupted by a third-party
library whose source code is unavailable. Some programming-rule-based tools, such as CCured
or other similar tools, cannot instrument the library to detect the bug. The second, bc-free, is a
bug where a dangling pointer dereferences an object that is first freed and then reallocated. Since
CCured uses garbage collection to manage memory allocation, this bug will not occur when the
code is linked with CCured. Consequently, CCured is unable to detect this bug. However, when
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the program is not linked with CCured, the bug will re-occur.
We also construct an extracted version of a bug from a recent version of Linux
(linux-2.6.6/arch/sparc64/prom/memory.c). This bug is caused by copy-paste and results in an
incorrect pointer assignment. The wrong pointer assignment causes incorrect results in some cases.
Such copy-paste bugs are common in Linux [CYC+01, LLMZ04]. Since we cannot run Linux in
our simulator, we built a simple benchmark (linux-simple) to measure the effectiveness of PC
invariants on this type of bugs. Since this bug does not violate any programming rule, it is hard for
tools such as CCured and Purify to detect it.
In our experiments, we do not use any specific knowledge about the bugs. Instead, we blindly
monitor all global objects, heap objects and stack return addresses for all applications. AccMon
and AccMon-S can be used in any run (normal or abnormal) to detect potential bugs. To demon-
strate the capability of AccMon and AccMon-S to detect a bug, we need to use abnormal runs, as
do other run-time bug detection studies [CHM+03, ECGN99, ECGN00, HL02, NMW02]. To do
that, we use bug-exhibiting inputs to generate these abnormal runs. But this does not mean that
AccMon and AccMon-S need bug-exhibiting inputs to function.
The second set of experiments evaluates AccMon overheads using six bug-free SPEC2000
applications running the Test input data set, namely gzip, parse, vpr, mcf, twolf and bzip2.
4.6 Experimental Results
4.6.1 Overall Results
For the seven non-server buggy applications, AccMon and AccMon-S detect all ten bugs, and
found one previously unreported (to the best of our knowledge) bug. Table 4.4 compares the ef-
fectiveness and the overhead of AccMon, AccMon-S, Purify, CCured, and value-based invariant
detection tools. For the two server applications, AccMon-S detects the two test bugs. Table 4.5
compares AccMon-S, Purify, CCured, and value-based invariant detection tools on server pro-
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Application AccMon AccMon-S Purify CCured Value-Based
Invariants
Bug Over- Over- Bug Over- Bug Over- Bug
Detected? head head Detected? head Detected? head Detected?
ncompress-4.2.4 Yes 0.24X 10.39X No 8.33X Yes 0.17X Difficult*
linux-simple Yes 0.60X 57.83X No 32.84X No 5.50X Difficult
polymorph-0.4.0 Yes 0.76X 42.65X No 44.65X Yes 0.50X Difficult
gzip-1.2.4 Yes 0.94X 39.32X Yes 42.45X Yes 0.40X Easy
tar-1.13.25 Yes 1.04X 35.42X Yes 13.68X NR(Yes) NR Difficult
man-1.5h1 Yes 1.50X 26.08X Yes 4.83X Yes 0.69X Easy
Bug1: Yes Yes Yes Depends
bc-1.06 Bug2: Yes 2.88X 52.36X Yes 46.11X Yes 1.35X Difficult
bc-lib: Yes No No Depends
bc-free: Yes Yes No Difficult
Table 4.4: Overall results on non-server applications. For bc, Bug1 is in storage.c and Bug2 is
in util.c. For CCured, NR means that we have not modified the application’s source code to run
with CCured; NR(Yes) means that we estimate that CCured should be able to detect the bug if the
application were modified to conform to CCured’s requirements; *Difficult in column 9 means that
we could not find an effective way to detect the bug using value-based invariants.
Application AccMon-S Purify CCured Value-Based
Invariants
Bug Over- Bug Over- Bug Over- Bug
Detected? head Detected? head Detected? head Detected?
apache-1.3.27 Yes 32.17X No 37.50X NR(Yes) NR Difficult*
squid-2.3.s5 Yes 43.22X Yes 17.21X NR(Yes) NR Difficult
Table 4.5: Overall results for AccMon-S on servers. For CCured, NR means that we have not
modified the application’s source code to run with CCured; NR(Yes) means that we estimate that
CCured should be able to detect the bug if the application were modified to conform to CCured’s
requirements; *Difficult in column 8 means that we could not find an effective way to detect the
bug using value-based invariants.
grams.
The default setup for AccMon is a TLS-enabled iWatcher with an 8-entry CLB, and with only
write accesses monitored. The results of AccMon are obtained using this default setup unless oth-
erwise mentioned in Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3. AccMon’s initialization time to bring the PCT into
the cache is also included in AccMon’s overhead. The monitoring in iWatcher is always enabled
throughout the entire execution of a tested program (i.e., DisableMonitoring is never called). For
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AccMon-S, we evaluate its effectiveness using the same training and detection inputs as those for
AccMon, and it has the same debugging functionality as AccMon-S. Therefore, we only report its
overhead here. The default setup for AccMon-S has no software CLB because a software CLB
does not provide performance benefits, and monitors only write accesses.
The evaluation is done in two ways: actual experiments and best-knowledge analysis. If a tool
is available, and works with an application, we report the actual experimental results. But if the tool
does not target C/C++ programs, or cannot work with an application, we use our best knowledge
to estimate whether it can detect the bug or not. However, we cannot estimate its overhead. All
results with Purify, AccMon and AccMon-S are from actual experiments since these tools work
with all applications.
Application Training #Monitored #Monitored Monitored Max # of Ranking of # False
Overhead Accesses Accesses Sizes Monitored the Bug Alarms
after the CLB (Bytes) Objects
ncompress-4.2.4 1.20X 158995 13 806180 60 1 1
linux-simple 1.64X 11769 5 3352 43 1 0
polymorph-0.4.0 0.99X 520 4 10472 53 1 8
gzip-1.2.4 3.06X 274594 44441 396641 190 1 0
tar-1.13.25 1.52X 29729 102 88142 432 2 2
man-1.5h1 2.83X 27909 921 187898 644 1 0
bc-1.06 3.98X 260813 84716 467005 454 1,2,3,4 0
Table 4.6: Detailed results for AccMon on non-server programs. The column on number of mon-
itored accesses after the CLB is only for the bug-detection phase. Note that there are four bugs
detected for bc.
Table 4.6 shows the detailed AccMon results on the non-server programs. The detailed AccMon-
S results on these programs are very similar, except for AccMon-S’s training overheads, which are
very close to AccMon-S’s detection overheads (shown in Table 4.4). Table 4.7 shows the detailed
AccMon-S results for the server programs.
Functionality From Table 4.4, we see that AccMon and AccMon-S can catch bugs that can-
not be detected by other tools such as Purify, CCured and value-based invariant detection tools.
While AccMon catches all tested bugs, Purify misses four bugs: ncompress-4.2.4, linux-simple,
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Application Training #Monitored #Monitored Monitored Max # of Ranking of # False
Overhead Accesses Accesses Sizes Monitored the Bug Alarms
after the CLB (Bytes) Objects
apache-1.3.27 33.04X 50001 458 586190 189 1 0
squid-2.3.s5 43.86X 700014 31150 5243260 9049 1 4
Table 4.7: Detailed results for AccMon-S on server programs. The column on number of monitored
accesses after the CLB is only for the bug-detection phase.
polymorph-0.4.0 and bc-lib. Purify misses the bugs in ncompress-4.2.4 and polymorph-0.4.0 be-
cause it does not monitor stack accesses. Purify misses the bug in bc-lib because Purify cannot
detect the wrong pointer arithmetic that results in the corruption of a valid memory object instead
of Purify’s “red-zone” (padding inserted by Purify). Purify fails to detect the bug in linux-simple
because that bug does not violate any programming rule. Instead, it is just a simple incorrect
pointer assignment.
We have modified six applications to run with CCured (except tar-1.13.25). Of these six appli-
cations, CCured misses the bug in linux-simple, and the bc-free and bc-lib bugs in bc-1.06. The
reasons for missing the three bugs are, respectively: 1) the bug in linux-simple does not violate any
programming rule, 2) CCured uses garbage collection to manage memory allocation (explained in
Section 4.5), and 3) CCured cannot monitor accesses by a third-party library whose source code is
unavailable. For the bug in tar-1.13.25, we conservatively estimate that CCured would catch it.
Value-based invariant detection tools would miss six of the ten tested bugs because these bugs
do not violate any value-based invariant. To ensure a fair comparison, our evaluation with value-
based invariant detection tools is very conservative. We even used techniques beyond those de-
scribed in the previous value-based invariant papers, such as assuming perfect aliasing knowledge.
For the two servers (apache and squid), AccMon-S can catch the bugs (as shown in Table 4.5)
by using PC-based invariants. AccMon could also detect them if the simulator supported running
server programs, since it uses the same detection technique as AccMon-S.
Like all other bug detection tools, there are some bugs that AccMon and AccMon-S cannot
detect, for example, memory leaks, because PC-based invariants can only be used to catch bugs
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causing memory corruption; memory leaks do not corrupt the memory.
Overhead Table 4.4 shows that AccMon has an acceptable overhead, which is significantly lower
than Purify’s and AccMon-S’s. AccMon has an overhead of only 0.24-2.88 times, even though
most applications monitor hundreds of KBytes data (Table 4.6). This is an order of magnitude
less than Purify, which has an overhead of 4.83-46.11 times (the Purify results match the numbers
reported in [CHM+03]), and orders of magnitude less than AccMon-S’s overheads (10.39-57.83
times). For example, in ncompress-4.2.4, AccMon monitors a total of 0.8 MBytes of memory (Ta-
ble 4.6) and almost 92.1% of dynamic memory accesses (not shown in the tables), but it adds only
24% overhead (Table 4.4). For server applications, AccMon-S introduces 32 times of overhead for
apache and 43 times of overhead for squid (Table 4.5). We believe AccMon will have much less
overheads on servers too.
For those applications that can run on CCured, AccMon’s overhead is similar to that of CCured.
The only exception is linux-simple. CCured has performed very aggressive compiler-based opti-
mizations to reduce the amount of dynamic checks. We believe that AccMon’s overhead can be
further lowered with similar compiler-based optimizations. In addition, CCured requires non-
trivial modifications to an application’s source code to run. This requirement may not be practical
for some programs, especially large server programs.
CCured has a much higher overhead (5.5 times) than AccMon (0.60 times) for linux-simple.
The reason is that this program has many accesses to array structures, which cause many dynamic
checks to be inserted by CCured. In contrast, AccMon’s CLB hardware effectively filters out most
of these memory accesses and leaves a small number of accesses (only 5) to be checked by the
run-time system (See Table 4.6).
False Alarm Rate AccMon and AccMon-S have a very low false alarm rate, and the bugs are
ranked high in the error reports. Table 4.6 shows that for non-server applications, there are no false
alarms for four applications, and only 2-8 false alarms for two applications. Moreover, all bugs
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are ranked in the top 2 entries of the error reports. For server programs, there are no false alarms
for apache and only 4 false alarms for squid, as shown in Table 4.7. Therefore, a programmer can
easily identify real bugs.
4.6.2 Impact of the CLB
Figure 4.7 shows the impact of the CLB on AccMon’s overheads, and the sensitivity to the number
of entries in the CLB. We compare the overheads in three cases: without a CLB (CLB0), with
a 4-entry CLB (CLB4) and with an 8-entry CLB (CLB8). The overhead is broken down into
two parts: (1) the iWatcherOn/Off overhead (overhead for executing iWatcherOn/Off calls), and
(2) the monitoring plus other overhead. Since we support TLS, it is hard to further separate the
monitoring overhead from other overhead such as run-time system initialization (bringing the PCT
into the cache), the effect of instrumentation on compiler optimization, or the effect of resource
competition. However, we expect that the monitoring overhead dominates the other overheads for
most applications.
For AccMon-S, the software CLB has little impact on its overheads because of two reasons.
First, The overheads of AccMon-S come from not only the monitored accesses, but also the non-
monitored accesses, since it needs to look in the PCT table for every access to determine if the
access is monitored or not. A CLB can only reduce the overhead for monitored accesses, and does
not help with the non-monitored accesses, which are a large fraction of all accesses. Second, the
software CLB lookup time is much larger than the negligible hardware CLB lookup time, and close
to the PCT table lookup time. Therefore, it cannot save much even for monitored accesses.
Table 4.8 gives the 4-entry and 8-entry CLB hit ratios for the seven non-server applications in
AccMon, and the CLB hit ratios for all nine applications in AccMon-S. As we can see, the CLB
hit ratios in AccMon and AccMon-S are similar, and the slight differences are caused by different
binaries and memory allocation layouts.
Figure 4.7 shows that the CLB reduces AccMon’s overheads by a significant (28.9-80.6%)
amount. For example, the overhead of AccMon with gzip is reduced by a factor of 3.17 from
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Figure 4.7: Overhead introduced by AccMon with and without the CLB.
#en- ncom- linux- poly- gzip tar man bc apache squid
tries press simple morph
AccMon 4 99.9% 99.9% 99.2% 80.1% 51.5% 96.3% 43.2% - -
8 99.9% 99.9% 99.2% 83.8% 99.7% 96.7% 67.5% - -
AccMon-S 4 99.9% 99.8% 98.6% 75.2% 57.4% 99.4% 44.9% 99.70% 91.98%
8 99.9% 99.8% 98.8% 79.8% 98.7% 99.4% 64.9% 99.76% 94.97%
Table 4.8: CLB hit ratios for monitored accesses.
3.39 times to 1.07 times with a 4-entry CLB. This is because the 4-entry CLB filters 80% of the
triggering accesses in gzip, as indicated in Table 4.8. Only 20% of the triggering accesses are
processed by the AccMon monitoring function. This effect is shown in the 77.5% reduction in the
monitor+other overhead given in the breakdown of gzip in Figure 4.7.
Except in tar and bc, the overhead is reduced only slightly (0-12.1%) for most applications as
we go from a 4-entry CLB to an 8-entry CLB. The reason is that the CLB hit ratios only increase
slightly (0-3.7%) for these five applications. On the other hand, for tar and bc, an 8-entry CLB
reduces the overheads by 28.2% and 11.9%, benefiting from the 48.2% and 24.3% improvement
in the CLB hit ratios, respectively.
For apache and squid, since the hit ratios are very high (>90%) for both 4-entry CLB and
8-entry CLB, we can predict that if we could run the two servers on AccMon, their monitoring
overheads would be significantly reduced by using CLB.
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4.6.3 Impact of the Optimizations
Monitoring only Write Accesses AccMon’s overhead is reduced significantly (7.7-61.9%) by
monitoring only write accesses instead of all accesses. The rationale is discussed in section 4.3.4.
Figure 4.8 compares the overheads of monitoring both read/write accesses (rw) and write only ac-
cesses (wo). Table 4.9 shows the number of monitored accesses before and after the CLB filtering
process for both rw and wo.
In Figure 4.8, the reduction in overhead as we go from rw to wo comes from reducing the
number of monitored accesses. For example, in gzip the number of monitored accesses after the
CLB is reduced by 58.5% as we go rw to wo (Table 4.9), resulting in a 61.9% reduction in overhead
(Figure 4.8).
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Figure 4.8: Overhead of monitoring different types of accesses.
Application rw wo rw wo
(Before CLB) (Before CLB) (After CLB) (After CLB)
ncompress 334019 158995 27 13
linux-simple 178142 11769 5 5
polymorph 18658 520 5 4
gzip 1048300 274594 107079 44441
tar 107980 29729 188 102
man 3598 1518 737 90
bc 782901 260813 164371 84716
Table 4.9: Number of monitored accesses before and after CLB filtering for different types of
accesses.
In ncompress, linux-simple, and polymorph, going from rw to wo induces a very small absolute
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decrease in the number of monitored accesses after the CLB (Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.9).
However, linux-simple and polymorph show a significant overhead reduction in Figure 4.8. The
reason is that going from rw to wo causes a significant reduction of monitored accesses before the
CLB for these applications (Table 4.9). Since the PCT of an application is generated based on all
monitored accesses before the CLB, the size of the PCT is significantly reduced from rw to wo for
these two applications. As a result, the overhead of bringing the PCT into the cache (part of other
overhead) is reduced significantly, resulting in a similar reduction in the total overhead.
Compiler-Based False Alarm Pruning The compiler optimization that differentiates pointer/array
accesses from other accesses is effective at pruning false alarms. As shown on Table 4.10, this
optimization reduces the number of false alarms in tar-1.13.25 from 8 to 2. However, this opti-
mization fails for polymorph-0.4.0, because the bug causes the program to enter an error handler
that is never entered in normal execution, resulting in eight false alarms that are caused by the
pointer/array accesses inside the handler.
ncompress linux-simple polymorph gzip tar man bc
Before Pruning 1 0 8 1 8 0 0
After Pruning 0 0 8 0 2 0 0
Table 4.10: Number of false alarms before and after pruning.
4.6.4 Overhead with SPEC Benchmarks
Overall Results To measure AccMon overheads on bug-free applications, we run six SPEC2000
benchmarks, namely gzip, parser, vpr, mcf, twolf and bzip21, with the Test input data set. The
experiments use the default setup for AccMon: TLS-enabled, 8-entry CLB and only monitoring
write accesses.
1 For parser, we fast forward the program’s initialization phase, which lasts for about 280 million instructions,
because its behavior is not representative of steady state. To reduce simulation time, for both parser, vpr and bzip2, we
only run them for 300 million instructions.
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Table 4.11 shows the results for the six SPEC benchmarks. The overheads range from 1.29
to 4.14 times for all the six applications. The size of monitored memory is 6.5-117 MBytes.
Recall that the overhead is broken down into iWatcherOn/Off overhead and monitoring plus other
overhead. For all the six applications, the iWatcherOn/Off overhead is a substantial portion of the
total overhead. The large iWatcherOn/Off overhead is mainly the result of watching the locations
for return addresses. In this case, both iWatcherOn and iWatcherOff are invoked once per function
call.
The monitoring overhead is related to the number of monitored accesses per 1M instructions
after CLB filtering. As shown on Table 4.11, the number of monitored accesses per 1M instructions
is large for all the six applications, ranging from 12k to 73k. Fortunately, most of these accesses
are filtered by the CLB, as indicated by the high CLB hit ratios, 83.3%-99.9% for all these ap-
plications except twolf. This significantly reduces the monitoring overhead which, together with
other overheads (described in Section 4.6.2), accounts for the non-iWatcherOn/Off component of
the total overhead. For example, Table 4.11 shows that, with CLB, mcf and bzip2 have very few
monitored accesses per 1M instructions, 0.12 and 0.18 respectively. Therefore, they suffer very
small monitoring overheads, which are indicated by the very small monitoring+other overheads
(overhead-iWatcherOn/Off overhead), 0.04X for mcf and 0.19X for bzip2.
Appli- Overhead iWatcherOn/Off #Monitored #Monitored CLB Hit Monitored
cation Overhead Accesses Accesses per 1M Ratios Sizes
per 1M Inst. Inst. after CLB (%) (Bytes)
gzip 1.29X 0.80X 73215.78 5698.34 92.2 13533869
parser 3.16X 2.13X 12442.43 77.48 99.4 10244523
vpr 1.73X 0.95X 45238.16 7561.99 83.3 6585702
mcf 2.19X 2.15X 39509.37 0.12 >99.9 117385440
twolf 4.14X 1.94X 46267.82 30400.77 34.3 7988353
bzip2 1.35X 1.16X 44320.44 0.18 >99.9 25429319
Table 4.11: AccMon behavior for SPEC applications.
Impact of the CLB Figure 4.9 shows AccMon’s overheads with different CLB entries, no CLB
(CLB0), 4-entry CLB (CLB4) and 8-entry CLB (CLB8), on the six SPEC2000 benchmarks. Ta-
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ble 4.12 gives the 4-entry and 8-entry CLB hit ratios for the six benchmarks.
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Figure 4.9: Overhead introduced by AccMon with and without the CLB.
#Entries gzip parser vpr mcf twolf bzip2
4 50.5% 95.7% 79.8% 99.5% 26.7% 61.2%
8 92.2% 99.4% 83.3% >99.9% 34.3% >99.9%
Table 4.12: CLB hit ratios for monitored accesses.
As shown in Figure 4.9, comparing with the baseline case (no CLB), the overheads are sig-
nificantly reduced by 18.3-62.5% using 4-entry CLB and 25.8-80.4% using 8-entry CLB. For ex-
ample, in gzip, 4-entry CLB filters 50.5% of the monitored accesses as shown in Table 4.12. As
such, there is a 51.8% reduction from 2.18 times to 1.05 times in the monitor+other overhead, and
the total AccMon’s overhead is reduced from 4.33 times to 2.82 times. With a 8-entry CLB, the
monitor+other overhead is further reduced by 77.5% from 2.18 times to 0.49 times, and the total
overhead is reduced by a factor of 3.36 from 4.33 times to 1.29 times, because 92.2% (Table 4.12)
monitored accesses are filtered.
Among the six benchmarks, gzip and bzip2 have large overhead reduction from a 4-entry CLB
to a 8-entry CLB, because their CLB hit ratios greatly increase, from 50.5% to 92.2% for gzip
and from 61.2% to 99.9% for bzip2 as shown in Table 4.12. The overheads of the other four
benchmarks are only slightly reduced, due to the small CLB hit ratio improvement (0.4-7.6%).
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4.7 Summary
This chapter made three contributions. First, it proposed the novel idea of PC-based invariants to
detect memory-related bugs. Second, it efficiently implemented this idea using previously pro-
posed iWatcher hardware framework and proposed the CLB, a new architectural extension to the
iWatcher framework that significantly reduces the overhead of PC-based invariant debugging. The
hardware implementation called AccMon leverages architectural, run-time system and compiler
support. It detects ten tested bugs with few false alarms (0 for five applications and 2-8 for two
applications) and low overheads (0.24-2.88 times). The latter is an order of magnitude smaller than
Purify.
It also used the binary instrumentation tool PIN [LCM+05] to build a pure software implemen-
tation of PC-based invariant detection tool called AccMon-S. AccMon-S does not require hardware
support, but has much higher execution overhead (10.4X-57.8X), so it can only be used for in-
house bug detection instead of bug detection during production runs. Besides detecting all ten
bugs tested in AccMon, AccMon-S also detected two real bugs in two large real-word server ap-
plications, Apache and Squid with 0-4 false alarms.
Since PC-based invariants detection is a statistics-based approach, it can catch bugs that do
not violate any programming-based rules. For example, there are a few bugs in our experiments
that are detected by PC invariants but are missed by other tested tools such as Purify [HJ92] and
CCured [NMW02, CHM+03].
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Chapter 5
iChecker: Incremental Data Structure
Consistency Check
5.1 Overview
Consistency of a data structure means that the states of the data structure satisfy certain properties
during the entire program execution except within some operations that intentionally violate the
properties while evolving the data structure from one consistent state to another. For example, a
sorted doubly-linked list is consistent if the list nodes have values in order and every list node is
appropriately linked to its predecessor and successor. Such a list should remain consistent, for
instance, after an insertion of a new node in the list. But, during the insertion, the list is not
doubly-linked at some point.
Data-structure consistency is critical for many programs [DR03, DR05]. Unfortunately, soft-
ware faults may corrupt the data and cause inconsistency, which can make the program enter an
error state, generate wrong outputs, and even crash. For example, in the file-system case study
(Section 5.4.5), a fault in updating the inode bitmap causes an inconsistency. Consequently, the
program re-assigns an already used inode to a new file and loses the information of the original file
that was stored in this inode.
One approach to ensuring data-structure consistency is to statically analyze the code that can
potentially access the target data structure, for example using static analysis such as shape analy-
sis [SRW02, MS01], theorem proving [Pau94, BW96], or a combination of both [ZLKR04]. Static
analysis is highly automated and can be effectively used to verify several classes of consistency
properties and code. However, the inherent limitations of static analysis make it either incomplete
or unsound [FLL+02]. Interactive theorem provers can be used, in principle, to prove arbitrary
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properties, but they require a high level of expertise from the users and a large amount of manual
effort. Even a combination of static analysis and theorem proving has not been shown practical for
verifying the consistency properties for arbitrarily complicated data structures, especially those in
programs that are written in industrial programming languages such as C/C++.
Another, more widely used approach to ensuring data-structure consistency is to perform run-
time checks at the appropriate program points, e.g., at the entrance and the exit of relevant func-
tions. The checks are performed using assertions that either the programmers insert manually or a
compiler inserts automatically [GJKW97, MA87]. Each assertion typically calls a checking func-
tion (checker). This checking code can be manually written by programmers (in most practical
cases) or automatically generated from programmer-provided specifications [DR03, DR05].
The programmer would like to perform frequent run-time checks for the early detection of
data structure inconsistency, because it can limit the amount of damage caused by the error prop-
agation and reduce the time and effort needed for fault localization [DCRR04]. Unfortunately,
the traditional consistency check usually needs to traverse the entire data structure to determine
that the consistency properties hold. (A checker may find that some property does not hold after
traversing only a part of the structure.) Such global checks are fairly expensive and can incur large
overhead for large data structures with frequent checks, up to 416 times as reported in our experi-
mental results. Such big overhead prevents global checks being frequently invoked. consequently,
a data-structure corruption cannot be detected early enough.
A key observation about data structures is that a typical operation modifies only a small, lo-
calized part of the data structure. The effects of such small modifications on the consistency are
mostly local. Thus, it is often unnecessary to traverse the entire data structure to check the con-
sistency. If we start from a consistent state (e.g., after passing the last check) and the program
modifies only a small part of the state, it is sufficient to check the consistency of only the affected
part of the data structure. Consider, for example, a sorted doubly-linked list that was consistent
and in which a new node is inserted between two existing nodes. To verify if the data structure is
still consistent, we intuitively need to check only the new node and some existing node(s) whose
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pointers are modified; we do not need to traverse the entire list. We refer to a check on a partial
structure (e.g., a node in a list, a subtree in a tree, or an element in an array) as a local check. In
contrast, we refer to a traditional check of the entire structure as a global check.
It is conceivable that the incremental check can significantly reduce the time for checking data
consistency compared with the global check, especially when the data structure is large, and there
are only small modifications between two consecutive checks [DR03]. To perform incremental
checking, an effective solution is to borrow ideas from incremental computation [DRT81, YS88,
ABH02, RR93, LT95, ZL98]. It computes the new output incrementally by reusing parts of the old
computation (instead of by recomputing the entire output from the scratch), when the new input
and old input differ slightly. Unfortunately, most of previous works on incremental computation
were done in the context of (pure) functional languages and did not consider mutable data struc-
tures as used in imperative languages. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work
on incremental computation/checking of programs written in C, which is still one of the dominant
programming languages in industry, especially for performance critical systems and server soft-
ware. The main challenge for incremental checking of consistency in C programs is that any part
of a data structure may be potentially mutated by any write, including the “sneaky” writes caused
by dangling pointers, buffer overruns, or other memory corruptions.
This chapter presents our incremental checking framework called iChecker that leverages a
simple, previously proposed hardware iWatcher [ZQL+04] to provide an iChecker library for ef-
ficient, incremental, run-time consistency checks of mutable data structures in C programs. The
basic idea of iChecker is to perform a consistency check with a local check (on the parts that need
to be checked due to the modifications since the last consistency check) instead of with the global
check. Besides invoking the consistency checks (as in traditional global check), the programmer
only needs to indicate the data structure to be checked and its associated local check function, and
call a few library calls in limited places. It is iChecker’s responsibility to figure out on which part
of the data structure to perform this local check function. To achieve this functionality completely
in software would require monitoring almost every memory access except a few fraction that can
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be eliminated via sophisticated static program analysis.
More specifically, iChecker exploits the precise memory monitoring feature of iWatcher to
automatically build a dependency set for each part of the data structure (e.g., a node) to record
what other data this part’s consistency depends on. During the execution, iChecker also leverages
iWatcher to keep track of updates to data structures. At the check time, only those parts (of data
structures) that are affected by the updates are checked using the local checker function provided
by programmers.
We evaluate iChecker using four case studies: two micro-benchmarks (sorted doubly-linked
list and binary search tree) and two larger applications (a simple file system and an interactive
game). These case studies represent different types of structures and consistency checks, namely
pointer-based and array-based data structures, iterative and recursive global checks, and read-only
and read-write local checks.
Our experimental results show that iChecker requires only modest changes (25–108 lines in-
cluding the global checkers), which are 10–56 lines more than the modifications for traditional
global checks and only account for 0.1%–21% of the original code. Since iChecker leverages the
iWatcher support to efficiently catch the memory accesses to the data structure for both building
dependency sets and tracking modifications, for large data structures the time overhead of using
iChecker for incremental check is 1.1–155 times (23.3 times on average) less than that of the
global check with 0.3–17.9 times (11.2 on average) of space overhead, and the time overhead is
estimated to be 2–7 times less than a software-only implementation for incremental check. Note
that iChecker offers more improvement for the two larger applications in terms of the much smaller
time and space overhead, as well as the much smaller percentage modifications over the original
code, than for the two micro-benchmarks.
iChecker works for mutable data structures and thus applies to many C programs, including
even the low level system code such as parts of an operating system, as demonstrated in our file
system case study.
The main modification required by iChecker is that the programmer needs to provide the local
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checker based on the global checker. The programmer needs to ensure soundness of the local
checkers with respect to the global checker, similarly as the programmer needs to ensure soundness
of the global checker with respect to the desired properties. However, since the programmer’s
effort can bring significant benefits in some cases, like 155 times less overhead in the file system
example, we expect the programmer to be willing to invest such effort selectively.
iChecker provides a strong demonstration case of leveraging new hardware innovations in per-
forming software engineering tasks. This is important for two reasons. First, it can make a strong
influence on the hardware designers to include more extensions in the near-future microprocessors
to enhance software quality and programmers productivity. Second, when such new hardware is
ready, iChecker can immediately take advantage of the hardware.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we use an example to
show the iChecker interface. In Section 5.3, we describe the iChecker framework and its imple-
mentation. Then, we use four case studies to demonstrate the use of the iChecker framework in
Section 5.4, followed by the summary in Section 5.5.
5.2 iChecker Interface and Example
We use a sorted doubly-linked list as a simple example to illustrate how the programmers can use
the iChecker framework for incremental consistency checking. Figure 5.1 shows three instances
of sorted doubly-linked lists. There are two consistency properties: the nodes should have values
sorted in the ascending order, and every node should be appropriately linked to its predecessor and
successor.
Figure 5.2 shows the code for basic operations of the list. The highlighted code represents
modifications for incremental checking (as discussed below). Figure 5.2 also shows the function
isDoublyLinkedSortedList that performs a global consistency check, traversing the entire list and
checking that each node is properly linked and has a value in order. checkListNode is the local
check function, which, for a given node, checks if its successor’s value is not smaller than its own
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and its successor is pointing back to this node itself. Note that in our example the relationship
between any pair of nodes are associated only with the first node to avoid redundant checks.
N1 N2 N4
nil
l.head
N1 N2 N3
nil
l.head
...
...
(b)
(a)
N3
N1 N4
nil
l.head
(c)
...
N3
3
3 5 7
5 6 7
763 5
Figure 5.1: Sorted doubly-linked list: (a) the original list; (b) the list after insertion of N4; (c) the
list after removal of N2.
5.2.1 Modifications and iChecker Interface
The modifications shown in Figure 5.2 use the iChecker interface shown in Figure 5.3. They can
be inserted manually by the programmer or automatically by the compiler. We next explain each
modification and the general interface (one data structure and four functions) associated with it:
ICheckStruct: This structure from our iChecker library keeps track of the data required for incre-
mental checking. In the example, an instance of ICheckStruct is added to each list.
newICheckStruct: This function initializes the corresponding ICheckStruct that stores a function
pointer for the global check globalFunc, an address to pass as a parameter to the global check
globalPara, a function pointer for the local check used by incremental check localFunc, and the
size of a data structure part that forms the basic unit for the incremental check partSize. In the
example, newICheckStruct is called to initialize the above data structure when the list is initialized.
insertIntoICheckStruct: This function adds a data structure part to the new set of the ICheckStruct
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typedef struct node {
int val;
struct node *next;
struct node *prev;
} ListNode;
typedef struct list {
ListNode *head;
int size;
ICheckStruct *icStruct;
} List;
List *newList() {
List *l=(List *)malloc(sizeof(List));
l->head=NULL;
l->size=0;
l->icStruct=
newICheckStruct(&isDoublyLinkedSortedList,
(void*)l, &checkListNode,
sizeof(ListNode));
return l;
}
void insertIntoList(List *l, int val) {
ListNode *cur;
/*insert the node *cur with cur->val==val*/
......
insertIntoICheckStruct(l->icStruct, (void*)cur);
}
void removeFromList(List *l, int val) {
ListNode *cur;
/*remove the node *cur with cur->val==val*/
......
deleteFromICheckStruct(l->icStruct, (void*)cur);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
List *l = newList();
......
insertIntoList(l, 6);             /* line A */
if (!genericICheck(l->icStruct)) …;
......
removeFromList(l, 5);       /* line B */
if (!genericICheck(l->icStruct)) …;
......
}
/* isDoublyLinkedSortedList is the global checker, checkListNode is the local checker which is also used by the global checker */
int isDoublyLinkedSortedList(void *args) {
List *l=(List *)args;
ListNode *cur=l->head;
if (cur==NULL) return 1;
if (cur->prev!=NULL) return 0;
for (; cur!=NULL && cur->next!=NULL;
cur=cur->next) {
if (!checkListNode(cur)) return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int checkListNode(void *args) {
ListNode *cur=(ListNode *)args;
if (cur->next==NULL) return 1;
if (cur->next->prev!=cur) return 0;
if (cur->val>cur->next->val) return 0;
return 1;
}
Figure 5.2: Code with the modifications for incremental check.
pointed by icStruct for checking. In the example, insertIntoICheckStruct is called after inserting
a node in the list.
deleteFromICheckStruct: This function removes a data structure part from the dependency sets,
new set, and affected set (that it belongs to) of icStruct, indicating that there is no need to check
this part later. In the example, deleteFromICheckStruct is called after removing a node from the
list.
handleOrder: This function notifies the library to handle the special order of the local checks for
the data structure corresponding to the icStruct. It is only invoked in special cases.
genericICheck: This function performs the incremental check for the data structure corresponding
to the ICheckStruct pointer icStruct. The return value of -1 means that there are no modifications
since the last check and thus nothing needs to be checked, 1 means success, and 0 means failure.
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/* globalFunc: function pointer for global check */
/* globalPara: the parameter for global check */
/* localFunc: function pointer for local check */
/* partSize: the size of a data structure part */
/* which is the basic unit for incremental check */
/* return: the ICheckStruct for incremental check */
ICheckStruct *newICheckStruct(Function globalFunc,
void *globalPara, Function localFunc, int partSize);
/* icStruct: pointer to the associated ICheckStruct */
/* part: the address of the new part */
void insertIntoICheckStruct(ICheckStruct *icStruct,
void *part);
/* icStruct: pointer to the associated ICheckStruct */
/* part: the address of the removed part */
void deleteFromICheckStruct(ICheckStruct *icStruct,
void *part);
/* icStruct: pointer to the associated ICheckStruct */
void handleOrder(ICheckStruct *icStruct);
/* icStruct: pointer to the associated ICheckStruct */
/* return code: -1 no check, 1 pass, 0 failure */
int genericICheck(ICheckStruct *icStruct);
Figure 5.3: Functions in iChecker interface.
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This function should be called when the check is desired.
Besides the above modifications, the programmer may also need to provide a local checking
function. In this example, the local checker is already a function called by the global checker, so
the programmer does not need to write anything additional. In more advanced examples discussed
in Section 5.4, the programmer needs to provide a local checker.
5.2.2 Incremental Check Demonstration
Assume that executing the main function in the example produces the list shown in Figure 5.1(a)
right before inserting the value 6. The list after the insertion is shown in Figure 5.1(b). Performing
the incremental check after the insertion requires that only the nodes N2 and N4 (shown in bold)
are checked using the local checker checkListNode. In contrast, the global check would traverse
all the nodes. Further execution removes the value 5 from the list. The list after the removal is
shown in Figure 5.1(c). After the deletion, iChecker performs the local check only on the node N1
(shown in bold), whereas the global check would once again traverse all the nodes.
5.3 iChecker Framework
This section first gives an overview of iChecker framework followed by the detailed iChecker
library implementation. It next explains how we address the three most important challenges for
incremental consistency checks. It finally illustrates the framework using the sorted, doubly-linked
list example.
5.3.1 Overview
Incremental consistency checking of mutable data structures should check only the parts of the
data structure whose consistency may have changed due to modifications performed since the last
consistency check. To achieve this, we propose a mechanism that builds a dependency set for each
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part (e.g., a node in a list, a subtree in a tree, or an element in an array) of the data structure. The
dependency set for a part is the set of data on which this part’s consistency depends. For example,
as explained in Section 5.2, the dependency set of a node in the sorted doubly-linked list would
include its value, its next field, its successor’s value, and the successor’s prev field.
The incremental check is performed on two types of parts. First, all new parts added since
the last check are checked using the local checker; during this checking, iChecker automatically
builds a dependency set for each new part. Second, each affected part, i.e., an existing part whose
dependency set has a memory location that changed value since the last check, is re-checked using
the local checker. During each local check, the dependency set for the corresponding part is also
updated as some data may not be correlated to this part any more and some other may become this
part’s new “neighbors”.
To implement the above incremental check process, we need to address three challenges: 1) ob-
tain a local checker, 2) track modifications since the last check, and 3) find affected parts of the data
structure that need to be checked based on the modifications. Our goal is to design and implement
a framework that can address these challenges and, in the mean time, also achieve efficiency, sim-
plicity, and flexibility. To achieve this goal, our iChecker framework leverages iWatcher [ZQL+04]
and provides a run-time iChecker library. Table 5.1 shows the main functionality of the hardware
and library.
Component Main Functionality
Hardware 1. Track the monitored writes and reads
(iWatcher) 2. Trigger the monitoring functions
Library 1. build and update dependency sets
(iChecker) 2. Track modifications that can affect consistency
3. Maintain an internal data structure for
incremental check
4. Invoke the local checker for each new or
affected part
Table 5.1: Main functionality of the iChecker components.
Our framework uses iWatcher to automatically track the writes and reads to the checked data
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structure (monitored accesses); iWatcher also automatically triggers the monitoring functions for
monitored accesses. Our library has two monitoring functions. The read monitoring function
builds/updates dependency sets using monitored reads, and the write function determines affected
parts based on monitored writes (modifications) and dependency sets. For building/updating the
dependency set of a part, the library informs iWatcher to track the monitored reads only during the
local check of this part. The library also maintains an internal data structure, which includes the
dependency sets. Finally, the library invokes the local checker for each new and affected part.
Using hardware, we can efficiently track writes to and reads from the checked data structure.
Hardware passes information about writes to the library so it can track the modifications performed
since the last check. Hardware passes information about reads to the library so that it can build and
update dependency sets.
Between simplicity and flexibility, there is a trade-off: if a framework requires less modifica-
tions to the application, it is simpler for programmers to use but less flexible in supporting different
structures and consistency properties. Our design choice is to find a balance. To achieve simplicity,
our framework provides the iChecker library that exposes simple interface (Section 5.2.1) to the
application and hides lots of implementation details, including the interaction with iWatcher. To
achieve flexibility, we ask the programmer to provide the local checker.
5.3.2 Library Implementation
The iChecker library consists of one data structure, ICheckStruct, and four functions, newICheck-
Struct, insertIntoICheckStruct, deleteFromICheckStruct, and genericICheck. Recall that Figure 5.3
shows the interface for these functions.
The library data structure ICheckStruct maintains the information necessary for incremental
check. Each instance of checked application data structure is associated with an instance of the
library data structure ICheckStruct. In addition to the information described in Section 5.2, the
ICheckStruct structure also contains a table that stores dependency sets for each checked part, a
new set of parts that have never been checked, and an affected set of old parts whose dependency
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sets have some modified locations.
The implementation of newICheckStruct and insertIntoICheckStruct are straightforward as de-
scribed in Section 5.2. The genericICheck function performs the incremental consistency check
procedure. The application calls this function when a check is required. The function does the
following: 1) calls iWatcherOn for each element in the new set to notify iWatcher to monitor these
elements, 2) performs local check on each element in the new set and the affected set, and 3)
informs iWatcher to track the monitored reads only inside the local check. At monitored reads,
iWatcher automatically triggers the read monitoring function (provided by the library but not ex-
posed to the user) to build/update dependency sets. The local checker returns 0 or 1 depending on
the consistency result, and -1 if there is no element in either the new set or the affected set.
5.3.3 Obtaining an Incremental Checker
We assume that the application provides the global checker. To handle different types of structures
and consistency properties, we also require the application to provide the local checker, which
is usually already provided to implement the global checker. Without any high-level semantic
information about the checked data structure, it would be very difficult to automatically generate
the local checker only based on the global checker.
5.3.4 Efficient Tracking of Modifications
Our framework dynamically tracks modifications to the checked data structure using iWatcher
hardware [ZQL+04]. An alternative approach for tracking modifications would be using soft-
ware instrumentation to intercept most stores to check if the address is a monitored location. Due
to aliasing problem, the instrumentation cannot precisely determine which stores could access a
monitored location. This approach would induce larger overhead and contradict our efficiency
goal.
Recall that during the genericICheck, each new part is monitored because the library calls
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iWatcherOn for a new part. iWatcher can automatically catch the writes to the monitored locations.
5.3.5 Finding the Affected Parts
Our framework uses dependency sets to determine the affected parts that need to be checked during
the next incremental check. Each dependency set has the format l : {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, where l is a
memory location of a checked data-structure part and l1, l2, . . . , ln are memory locations inside
the checked data-structure. The dependency set states that the part at memory location l depends
on the memory locations l1, l2, . . . , ln. If any of the memory locations l1, l2, . . . , ln is modified, a
local check needs to be performed for the part l. With the help from iWatcher, the iChecker library
builds and updates dependency sets: the library functions build and update dependency sets based
on the monitored reads that iWatcher tracks during the local check. The intuition for this is the
following: if the execution of local checker for the part at l reads only the locations l1, l2, . . . , ln,
then the check result for l depends on l1, l2, . . . , ln.
Based on the dependency sets and the modifications, the library can compute which parts
should be incrementally checked at the next consistency check. Since modifications potentially
affect the consistency of these parts, we call these parts affected parts. The library adds them to
the affected set of the corresponding ICheckStruct. The parts in the affected set are incremen-
tally checked when genericICheck is called. For example, based on the above dependency set, if
location l2 is modified, iChecker adds l to the affected set so it will check l later.
5.3.6 Analysis on the Sorted Doubly-Linked List
We next provide a detailed analysis of incremental checking for the sorted doubly-linked list exam-
ple in Section 5.2. Figure 5.1(a) shows the list l right before the execution of line A in Figure 5.2.
Assume that iChecker has already built the dependency sets for all nodes in Figure 5.1(a) and in-
structed iWatcher to monitor all these nodes. The dependency sets are
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&N1 : {&(N1.next),&(N2.prev),&N1,&(N1.val),&(N2.val)}&N2 : {&(N2.next),&(N3.prev),&N2,&(
...
We illustrate how iChecker tracks modifications and builds the dependency sets using the node
N4 as an example part. Line A inserts the node N4, and the list becomes as shown in Figure 5.1(b).
This insertion modifies the monitored locations &(N2.next) and &(N3.prev); iChecker detects
this because iWatcher automatically tracks all accesses to monitored locations. Based on the mod-
ifications and the above dependency sets, iChecker adds &N2 to the affected set.
At the end of the insertion function, insertIntoICheckStruct adds &N4 to the new set. The
genericICheck after line A then performs the local checks on &N4 (which is in the new set) and
&N2 (which is in the affected set). The execution of the check checkListNode (from Figure 5.2) on
&N4 reads locations &(N4.next), &(N4.next → prev) (&(N3.prev)), &N4, &(N4.val), and
&(N4.next → val) (&(N3.val)). Therefore, the library builds the dependency set for node N4
&N4 : {&(N4.next),&(N3.prev),&N4,&(N4.val),&(N3.val)}
Similarly, the library updates the dependency set for node N2
&N2 : {&(N2.next),&(N4.prev),&N2,&(N2.val),&(N4.val)}
After the incremental check, genericICheck makes the new set and the affected set empty.
Line B removes the node N2, and the list becomes as shown in Figure 5.1(c). This deletion
modifies &(N1.next), &(N4.prev), &(N2.next), and &(N2.prev), so iChecker adds &N1 and
&N2 to the affected sets. However, N2 is removed from the list, and the dependency set for N2
is removed during the deleteFromICheckStruct call (at the end of the deletion). After line B, thus,
genericICheck only invokes the local check on &N1 and updates its dependency set to
&N1 : {&(N1.next),&(N4.prev),&N1,&(N1.val),&(N4.val)}
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Subject Data structure type Global checker type Local checker type Shadow
array-based pointer-based iterative recursive read-only read-write no yes
list X X X X
tree X X X X
filesystem X X X X
Freeciv X X X X X
Table 5.2: Subject classification. The data structures in Freeciv contain both array-based and
pointer-based parts.
5.4 Case Studies
This section demonstrates the use of our iChecker framework in four case studies: a sorted doubly-
linked list, a binary search tree, a simplified Linux file system, and an interactive game Freeciv.
The first two studies are micro-benchmarks, and the last two were applications used in previous
studies on detecting and repairing inconsistencies in data structures [DR03, DR05].
At the end, we also use a small sorted doubly-linked list and a small binary search tree to
serve as negative examples for which using incremental checks imposes larger overhead than using
global checks.
5.4.1 Subject Characteristics
We chose these four subjects for our case studies because they have very different data structure
and consistency characteristics. Table 5.2 shows these characteristics. We categorize the subjects
based on four aspects: data structure type, global checker type, local checker type, and check
complexity (need shadow copy or not).
If the global checker is recursive, we add additional fields in the checked structure to record
the output of recursive functions for incremental check (Section 5.4.4). Read-only means that the
local checker only reads from the checked data structure, whereas read-write means that the local
checker also writes to the checked data structure. For the latter, the order of local checks is critical
for the correctness (Section 5.4.4). Shadow means that the checkers (both global and local) need to
maintain a shadow copy of some parts of the checked data structure; a local checker with shadow
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structure needs the old value of a checked part for updating the shadow structure (Section 5.4.5).
5.4.2 Evaluation Methodology
Since our iChecker framework uses the iWatcher hardware, we implement the framework using the
cycle-accurate execution-driven simulator that was also used in many previous studies [MRH+02,
PT03, ZQL+04, ZLF+04]. The simulator simulates a 2.4 GHz machine with 2-level caches and
512 MB RAM. All cache misses are simulated as in real machines, thus the performance impact
caused by all memory accesses is fully simulated. We implemented the iChecker library in C. All
four subject programs are also in C.
For each case study, we will describe important consistency properties, provide global checkers
and local checkers for these properties, and insert calls to perform consistency checks at the end of
the function calls that modify the data structures.
Since our proposed incremental check mechanism can be also implemented without hardware
support for catching monitored memory accesses, we also estimate the time overhead of potential
software-only implementations. To catch accesses to the checked data structure using only soft-
ware, the most straightforward way (called SoftImp) is to instrument all reads inside the local
checker and all writes anywhere in the program. In contrast to iWatcher that looks up its Check
Table (which maps monitored locations to their associated monitoring functions) only for accesses
to monitored locations, a software-only implementation needs to look up its own table for every
instrumented read or write instruction, often finding that the access is to a non-monitored location.
Since the tables in two approaches would be similar, we use the average lookup time of iWatcher to
approximate of a software-only implementation, specifically the time for those lookups that access
a non-monitored location. Therefore, the estimated execution time of a software-only implemen-
tation is:
estimated time = iChecker time + avg lookup
∗ (#instrumented accesses−#monitored accesses)
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We obtain all four parts of the formula from our simulations.
Although compilers can statically decide the addresses of some accesses (e.g. using pointer
analysis) and eliminate some instrumentations in the software implementation, the fraction of re-
duction in instrumented memory accesses is usually not very large for programs like ours that use
pointers to do fine-grain manipulation of data structures.
Another way to do local check in software is that the programmer invokes the local checker on
the parts of the data structure that she knows may have been changed. For example, after inserting
a node into the list, the programmer could check only the new node and its neighbors. Although
this way does not require tracking of memory accesses, it cannot detect unintended modifications,
e.g. through memory corruption. Therefore, we do not compare it with the global check and our
incremental check.
Table 5.3 shows the time overheads (over the baseline, original program without checks) of
global check, the time and space overheads (over the baseline) of incremental check using iChecker
framework, as well as the estimated time overheads of SoftImp for software-only incremental
check. The space overheads of global check are very small, and the space overheads of SoftImp
should be similar to those of incremental check using iChecker. Table 5.4 shows the sizes of the
original code as well as the modifications (the modifications for iChecker count the global checker)
for all programs.
Application global iChecker SoftImp
time time space time
Sorted n=2000 3.1X 2.8X 11.2X 18.1X
doubly-linked n=4000 2.8X 1.3X 12.8X 6.5X
list n=8000 2.5X 0.5X 14.1X 2.6X
Binary n=2000 103.9X 35.8X 14.3X 257.0X
search n=4000 210.7X 41.6X 16.1X 253.1X
tree n=8000 416.4X 50.1X 17.9X 249.2X
Filesystem 6.2X 0.04X 0.3X 0.1X
Freeciv 0.7X 0.1X 2.5X 0.2X
Table 5.3: Overheads of consistency checks for four case studies
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Subject Original code size (LOC) Modification size (LOC)
global iChecker
list 149 15 25
tree 172 18 36
filesystem 2871 37 93
Freeciv 88788 52 108
Table 5.4: Sizes of original code and modifications. The LOC refers to the original code and
modifications for local and global checkers.
5.4.3 Sorted Doubly-Linked List
The sorted doubly-linked list is our running example from Section 5.2. The workload program
first inserts n nodes with random values, then randomly removes 100 nodes. We perform the
consistency check at the end of each insertion and deletion call.
Performance As shown in Table 5.3, iChecker can reduce the check time overhead by a factor of
1.1–5 for this program. The larger the n the higher the reduction because a larger data structure
incurs a higher time overhead with global checks. iChecker’s check time overhead is also 5-6 times
smaller than the estimated overhead of a software-only implementation. The large space overheads
in this benchmark are because the simple program only contains the list structure. As we can see,
for more complicated programs like Filesystem and Freeciv, the space overheads are smaller.
5.4.4 Binary Search Tree
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Figure 5.4: Binary search tree: (a) the original tree (b) the tree after insertion of N4; (c) the tree
after removal of N2. The nodes in bold will be checked after the operation.
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Example instance: Figure 5.5(a) shows instances of a binary search tree.
Consistency property: We require the tree to be ordered for binary search: for each node N , the
maximum value in N ’s left subtree is not greater than the value in N , and the minimum value in
N ’s right subtree is not less than the value in N . This property also implies that the nodes form a
tree (not an arbitrary graph with cycles).
int isOk(void *args) {
TreeNode *t=(TreeNode *)args;
if (t==0) return 1;
if (t->left !=0 && (!isOk(t->left) || max(t->left)>=t->val))
return 0;
if (t->right !=0 && (!isOk(t->right) || min(t->right)<=t->val))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int max(TreeNode * t) {
if (t->right!=0)
return max(t->right);
return t->val;
}
int min(TreeNode * t) {
if (t->left!=0)
return min(t->left);
return t->val;
}
int isOkICheck(void *args) {
TreeNode *t=(TreeNode *)args;
if (t==0) return 1;
if (t->left !=0 && (!t->left->isOk) || t->left->max>=t->val))
return 0;
if (t->right !=0 && (!t->right->isOk || t->right->min<=t->val))
return 0;
t->max=maxI(t);
t->min=minI(t);
t->isOk=1;
return 1;
}
int maxI(TreeNode * t) {
if (t->right!=0)
return t->right->max;
return t->val;
}
int minI(TreeNode * t) {
if (t->left!=0)
return t->left->min;
return t->val;
}
(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: The checkers for binary search tree: (a) global checker and (b) local checker.
Global checker: Figure 5.5(a) shows the global checker. It is a recursive function and also uses
the recursive max and min helper functions. The parameter for the global checker is the root of
the tree. Intuitively, the local checker should perform the similar check but only on a subtree that
was modified. However, if we simply use the global checker as the local checker (by just passing
the root of a subtree as the parameter for local check), the dependency set for any tree node would
include all its descendants because the recursive calls eventually access all its descendants. In
particular, the dependency set for the root would include all tree nodes. Hence, if anything in the
tree changes, the root would need to be incrementally checked, which is the same as the global
check.
Local checker: The above problem can be solved by following this simple three-step guideline: 1)
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for each recursive function called in the global checker, add a corresponding field in the structure
part; 2) update these fields in the local checker; and 3) replace function calls with field reads
in recursive helper functions. In particular, for the tree, it means adding fields isOk, max, and
min to the TreeNode structure. Figure 5.5(b) shows the local checker that updates the fields in
isOkICheck and reads them in the maxI and minI functions.
Check propagation: The local checker updates the max and min fields, which can trigger check
propagation: checking a node N can trigger checking of the N ’s parent (due to the possible
changes in its max or min values), which can then trigger checking of the N ’s grandparent, and
so on until the root node. For example, Figure 5.4(b) shows the tree after inserting N4 to the
tree. Suppose that the consistency has been checked right before the insertion. Then checking
consistency right after the insertion requires that N4 be checked because it is a new node. Since
N3 depends on its right child (that has changed from NULL to &N4), N3 needs be checked, too.
The check on N3 changes its max from 12 to 13, and thus its parent N2 also needs be checked
(because N2 depends on N3.max). In this example, check propagation stops at N2. In general,
it can proceed to the root, which means that the incremental check may need to check (only) one
entire path in the tree, whereas the global check always needs to traverse the entire tree.
Check order: The writes in the local checker also raise the issue of the order of the local checks. If
some node and its ancestor both need to be checked, ideally the checking should follow the bottom-
up order, i.e., check the descendants before checking the ancestors, because checking ancestors
needs max and min values that may be updated due to the check propagation. However, the
current implementation of our framework simply follows the order of modifications for check
order. If not used carefully, this order may produce wrong check results. For example, in the
removal case of Figure 5.4(c), the modification order is N1, N4, N3, but the correct check order
should be N3, N4, N1.
To guarantee the correct check result for the local checker that is read-write, the library does the
following. After checking one data-structure part (one node for tree), the library records the check
result. If some later checks propagate to this part (indicating that the order was suboptimal), the li-
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brary checks the part again. The process repeats until fixed point, when there is no order violation.
This process terminates even for cyclic dependencies when local checkers are correct. The appli-
cation notifies the library to handle the order by calling the library function handleOrder(icStruct).
Note that the check propagation and check order issues do not arise in the list example, because
the local checker only reads from the data structure, which is indeed the common case for checks.
Other code modifications: Similarly to the list example, the program for tree also needs to call
newICheckStruct for initialization, insertIntoICheckStruct when inserting a new tree node, delete-
FromICheckStruct when removing a node from the tree, and genericICheck for a consistency
check.
Performance The workload program first inserts n nodes with random values, then randomly
removes 100 nodes. We perform the consistency check at the end of each insertion and deletion.
Table 5.3 shows that iChecker reduces the check time overhead by 2.9–8 times compared to global
checks and 5–7 times compared to the software-only estimation. The large space overheads are
due to the same reason as that for the linked list.
5.4.5 A Simplified Linux File System
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Figure 5.6: A simplified Linux file system application.
This subject program was implemented and used by Demsky et al. [DR03, DR05] in previous
studies on detecting and repairing data-structure inconsistencies. It is a simplified version of the
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Linux ext2 file system.
Example instance: As shown in Figure 5.6, the file system consists of an array of blocks. The first
five blocks are used to keep the file system meta information. The Inode block contains all inode
entries, the InodeBitmap block identifies the used and free inode entries, and the BlockBitmap
block identifies the used and free blocks. Each inode entry has a ref field. If an inode entry is used,
it should have ref > 0; otherwise, it should have ref = 0. Each inode entry also has 12 block
pointers blockptr[0..11], and each pointer either points to a block used by this inode, or equals to
NULL. Both inode bitmap and block bitmap are an array of chars.
Consistency properties: We check two properties, inodeConsistency that requires the status (used
or free) of all inode entries to match the corresponding inode bitmap bits (1 or 0) and blockConsis-
tency that requires the status of all blocks to match the corresponding block bitmap bits.
int checkInode(void *args) {
/* ptr points to the file system block array */
/* itb points to the inode block */
struct block *ptr=(struct block *)args;
struct InodeBlock *itb=(struct InodeBlock *) &ptr[itbptr];
/* ib.inode is the inode bitmap */
/* itb->entries[i] is the ith inode entry */
for (int i=0; i<NUMINODES; i++) {
if ((!(ib.inode[i/8]&(1<<(i%8))) && itb->entries[i].ref>0) ||
((ib.inode[i/8]&(1<<(i%8))) && itb->entries[i].ref<=0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int checkInodeICheck(void *args) {
struct InodeBlock *itb=(struct InodeBlock *) &ptr[itbptr];
/* iboffset points to the checked char in the inode bitmap */
/* startEntry is 1st in the 8 entries corresponding to the */
/* checked char */
char *iboffset = (char *)args;
int startEntry = (iboffset-(char *)(&ib))*8;
for (int i=0; i<8; i++) {
if ((!((*iboffset)&(1<<i)) && itb->entries[startEntry+i].ref>0)
|| (((*iboffset)&(1<<i)) & itb->entries[startEntry+i].ref<=0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
(b)(a)
Figure 5.7: The checkers for inodeConsistency in the simplified Linux file system: (a) global
checker and (b) local checker.
Check inodeConsistency Global checker: Figure 5.7(a) shows the global checker. Since the
status of an inode entry is determined by its ref , the global checker checks if the ref in each inode
entry matches the corresponding bit in the inode bitmap.
Local checker: A basic data-structure part for local checker is a char in the inode bitmap array. A
char in the inode bitmap corresponds to 8 consecutive inode entries. Figure 5.7(b) shows the local
checker. It only checks if the bits in the given char match the ref fields in the corresponding 8
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inode entries.
Other modifications: As usual, we need to initialize ICheckStruct with newICheckStruct. After
the initialization, we also need to insert all chars from the inode bitmap array into the new set
by using insertIntoICheckStruct, because all these array elements should be checked during the
next/first incremental check. As for dynamic structures (e.g., list or tree), we call genericICheck
for consistency checking.
We also need to monitor the ref fields of all inode entries. However, the ref field is not a part
of incremental check, so we cannot use insertIntoICheckStruct call to notify the library to call
iWatcherOn on these fields. Therefore, at the beginning, we need to explicitly call iWatcherOn
for all ref fields.
int checkBlock() {
for (int i=0; i<NUMBLOCK/8; i++)
if (bb.blocks[i]!=shadowbb.blocks[i])
return 0;
for (i=0; i<NUMBLOCK%8; i++)
if ((bb.blocks[NUMBLOCK/8]&(1<<(i%8)))!=
(shadowbb.blocks[NUMBLOCK/8]&(1<<(i%8))))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int genBlockBitmap(void *args) {
struct block *ptr=(struct block *)args;
struct InodeBlock *itb=(struct InodeBlock *) &ptr[itbptr];
/* shadowbb.blocks is the shadow block bitmap */
/* bb.blocks is the file system block bitmap */
/* itb->entries[i].Blockptr[j] is the jth block pointer of the ith inode */
for (int i=0; i<NUMINODES; i++) {
for (int j=0; j<12; j++) {
if (itb->entries[i].Blockptr[j]!=NULL) {
int k=itb->entries[i].Blockptr[j];
if (shadowbb.blocks[k/8]&(1<<(k%8)))
return 0;
shadowbb.blocks[k/8]=shadowbb.blocks[k/8]|(1<<(k%8));
}
}
}
return 1;
}
int genBlockBitmapICheck(void *args) {
int *bptr = (int *)args;
struct InodeBlock *itb=(struct InodeBlock *) &ptr[itbptr];
int index = 12*(bptr-(int *)(itb)/sizeof(Inode)
+(bptr-(int *)(itb))%sizeof(Inode)-1;
/* old array stores old values for all block pointers */
/* old[index] keeps old value for the checked block pointer bptr */
if (old[index]!=0) {
// reset old bit to 0
if (!(shadowbb.blocks[old[index]/8]&(1<<(old[index]%8))))
return 0;
shadowbb.blocks[old[index]]&=0xff^(1<<(old[index]%8));
}
if (*bptr!=0) {
if (shadowbb.blocks[(*bptr)/8]&(1<<((*bptr)%8)))
return 0;
shadowbb.blocks[(*bptr)/8]|=1<<((*bptr)%8);
old[index]=*bptr;
}
return 1;
}
(b)(a)
Figure 5.8: The checkers for blockConsistency in the simplified Linux file system: (a) global
checker and (b) local checker.
Check blockConsistency Global checker: The consistency check for block is not as straight-
forward as the check for inode because the status of a block is determined not by a field of the
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block structure, but by block pointers of other data: inode entries. One straightforward way to
implement the global check function is: for every bit in the block bitmap, search every inode to
see if any blockptr in the inode points to the corresponding block. If the results do not match (e.g.
the bit in the bitmap is set to 1 but there is no inode’s blockptr point to the corresponding block,
or vice versa), the data structure is inconsistent. While this implementation is simple, it is very
inefficient because for every bit, it needs to search every inode. To improve checking efficiency,
an incorrect solution is to simply start from inode entries and check, for each inode entry, to see
if blocks pointed by its blockptr field has the corresponding bit in the block bitmap set to 1. Such
checking procedure is insufficient because it does not check the consistency properties for those
bits whose blocks are not pointed by the blockptr field of any inode.
To optimize performance, a correct and efficient alternative is to use a shadow block bitmap
(shadowbb.blocks) based on the block pointers of all inode entries by only traversing all the inodes
only once. Then the checker just needs to compare this shadow bitmap with the block bitmap of
the file system (bb.blocks). In our evaluation, we use this implementation for global checks, as
shown in Figure 5.8(a).
Local checker: We provide the local checker for genBlockBitmap instead of for checkBlock. A
basic part for generating the shadow bitmap incrementally is a block pointer. When a block pointer
changes, the local checker needs to know not only the new value, but also the old value, because
the checker needs to reset the corresponding bitmap bit for the old value to 0. Therefore, the
checker maintains an array for all old block pointer values. Figure 5.8(b) shows the local checker
for genBlockBitmap. The checkBlock remains the same as in the global checker.
Other modifications: As for inodeConsistency, we need to call newICheckStruct and insertInto-
ICheckStruct to add all block pointers to the new set and to call genericICheck for a consistency
check. We also need to explicitly call iWatcherOn on the entire block bitmap at the beginning.
Performance Our workload program performs the following sequence of file manipulations: first
open 145 files (it will create them since they did not exist), next write to each file and repeat this
write process 6000 times, then close these files, and finally open them again, read from them, and
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close them. We perform the inodeConsistency check at the end of openfile function because it
may change the inode entries and the inode bitmap, and the blockConsistency check at the end of
writefile function since it may change the block pointers and the block bitmap.
Table 5.3 shows that iChecker’s time overhead is 155 times smaller than the global check! It is
also twice smaller than the software-only estimation. The space overhead is only 0.3X.
5.4.6 Freeciv
Freeciv is a publicly available, interactive, multi-player game. It was also used in previous studies
on detecting and repairing data-structure inconsistencies [DR03, DR05]. Freeciv is a strategy game
that simulates development of civilizations. The program uses several data structures, but the most
interesting is the one that represents a map of the world. The map has a grid of tiles. Each tile has
a city pointer that either points to a city that is on the tile or is NULL if there is no city on the tile.
Consistency properties: We check the following two properties related to tiles and cities: 1)
cityononlyonetile that requires each city to be on only one tile, and 2) citymustononetile that re-
quires each city to be on one tile.
Global checker and local checker: Both the global checkers and local checkers are similar to
those in the file system example. All checkers for both consistency properties keep a shadow data
structure. In addition, the local checkers for both properties use an array that maintains the old city
on a tile for updating the shadow structure. Due to space constraints, we do not present all details.
Performance Our workload program consists of the computer playing several turns of the strategy
game against itself. We identify some important functions in Freeciv and check the consistencies
at the end of these functions. As shown in table 5.3, the time and space overheads of incremental
check are small.
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5.4.7 Negative Examples
While incremental checking can significantly reduce the checking overhead over global checks in
most programs, its performance gain depends on the size of the structure, the check frequence, and
the complexity of properties. Here, we will only demonstrate for small structures the overhead
could offset the performance gain, by scaling down our sorted doubly-linked list and binary search
tree. As shown in Table 5.5, incremental checks (both iChecker and the software-only estimation)
have larger overheads than global checks due to the overhead for tracking updates and maintaining
dependency sets. Therefore, in these cases, it is not a good idea to use incremental checks.
However, this does not affect the overall benefit of incremental checks because, after all, bugs
that occur in larger data structures are usually much harder to diagnose than those in smaller ones
and thereby have stronger demands for efficient ways to check data consistency as frequent as
possible. Efficient incremental checking methods such as iChecker exactly serve this purpose.
data structures n global iChecker SoftImp
sorted doubly- 100 1.67X 15.33X 145X
linked list 1000 3.01X 3.78X 33.53X
binary 100 3.25X 29X 240X
search tree 1000 50.24X 33.11X 257.74X
Table 5.5: Overheads with small data structures (n is the number of nodes inserted in the data
structure).
5.5 Summary
We have presented iChecker, a framework for incremental consistency checking of mutable data
structures in C programs. Our framework leverages a previously proposed iWatcher hardware to
provide a library for efficient, incremental, run-time consistency checking. The main idea is to
perform a consistency check using only a local check on the small parts of data structure modified
since the last consistency check. To use iChecker, the programmer needs to provide a local check
function, and iChecker automatically monitors memory accesses to build dependencies and to
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invoke the local check function only as necessary. Our experimental results show that for large
data structures, iChecker provides a significant speedup (23.3 times on average) over global checks
that traverse the entire data structure regardless of modifications.
iChecker requires the programmer to provide the local checker and guarantee the soundness
of the local checker. We expect the programmer to be willing to do that to achieve the orders of
magnitude smaller overhead (like 155 times less overhead in the file system case).
We believe that iChecker has the potential to change the view that developers have on seemingly
high-overhead consistency checking (and assertions in general): as the overhead gets lower, we
expect developers to use checking more aggressively in various development tasks such as testing,
debugging, and program understanding.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation work provides architectural support for software debugging. More specifically, it
focuses on addressing the three limitations of dynamic monitoring for detecting memory-related
bugs: inefficiency, inaccuracy and limited bug coverage. The contributions of this work are it
proposes a simple and general architectural framework called iWatcher for low overhead location-
controlled dynamic monitoring, a new bug detection method, PC-based invariants, to catch hard-
to-find program-specific memory bugs, and a simple architectural extension to iWatcher to further
reduce the overhead of PC-based invariant debugging. It builds an automatic detection tool called
AccMon that uses PC invariants and leverages iWatcher with the CLB extension, and a pure soft-
ware detection tool called AccMon-S for PC invariants detection using PIN tool. It also reduces
the overhead of data structure consistency check in C programs by proposing an incremental check
framework called iChecker that leverages iWatcher for efficient consistency check of mutable data
structures.
Particularly, iWatcher automatically detects all accesses to a watched memory location, in-
cluding those by aliased pointer dereferences. To further reduce overhead and support rollback,
iWatcher can optionally leverage Thread-Level Speculation (TLS). The experimental results with
seven buggy applications (with various bugs) show that iWatcher detects all the bugs evaluated in
our experiments with only a 0.1-179% execution overhead. In contrast, a well-known open-source
bug detector called Valgrind induces orders of magnitude more overhead, and can only detect a
subset of the bugs.
To catch the hard-to-find bugs with low overhead, AccMon uses a statistics-based method, PC-
based invariants, and leverages architectural, run-time system and compiler support. It detects all
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ten tested bugs in non-server programs with few false alarms (0 for five applications and 2-8 for two
applications) and low overheads (0.24-2.88 times). The latter is an order of magnitude smaller than
Purify. Since AccMon uses a statistics-based approach, it can catch bugs that do not violate any
programming-based rules. For example, there are 3-4 bugs in our experiments that are detected
by AccMon but are missed by other tested tools such as Purify [HJ92] and CCured [NMW02,
CHM+03].
The software implementation of PC-based invariants, AccMon-S, is built by using the binary
instrumentation tool PIN. Although it does not need extra hardware, it introduces 10.4-57.8 times
execution overheads, orders of magnitude larger than AccMon’s overheads. Besides detecting all
ten bugs tested in AccMon, AccMon-S also detected two real bugs in two large real-word server
applications, Apache and Squid with few false alarms (0-4).
The idea for reducing the consistency check overhead is to perform a consistency check using
only a local check on the small parts of data structure modified since the last consistency check.
To use iChecker, the programmer only needs to provide a local check function, and iChecker auto-
matically monitors memory accesses to build dependencies and to invoke the local check function
only as necessary. Our experimental results show that iChecker provides a significant speedup (up
to 155 times) over global checks that traverse the entire data structure regardless of modifications.
In the future, I would like to explore hardware support and novel ideas for detecting other types
of bugs, apart from memory-related bugs that are the main focus of my thesis research. One of my
main targets is concurrency bugs, including data races and atomicity bugs that account for a large
portion of all bugs, especially in server software. The urgency of handling such bugs grows as
the emerging multicore architectures will lead to more multi-threaded applications. However, it is
notoriously hard to expose, reproduce, and catch such bugs due to the nondeterminism. It would be
interesting to investigate hardware support for efficiently detecting such bugs in production runs,
where they are more likely exposed than in in-house testing.
Another category is semantic bugs which are usually program specific and, thus, hard to detect
automatically. The main question is how to effectively collect such program-specific information.
112
Answering this question requires a deep understanding of semantic bugs and program behavior,
for example, by help from machine learning and statistics techniques.
I also plan to apply the incremental check idea to specific domains, such as file systems. It
would be very useful if we could significantly reduce the consistency check time for real-world file
systems.
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